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Act-of-Production Immunity
KENNETH J. MELILLI*
Imagine receipt of a government subpoena requiring the production of
one's diary. Imagine further that the subpoena is accompanied by a grant of
something called "act-of-production immunity." Finally, imagine that, consis-
tent with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and notwith-
standing the grant of such immunity, the government is permitted to make use
of the contents of that diary criminally to prosecute the witness.
Such a scenario is extreme but by no means farfetched. The plausibility of
such a result will depend upon just how the courts unravel the intersection of
two fifth amendment doctrines: immunity and the act-of-production privilege.
The latter doctrine, which limits the privilege against self-incrimination to the
act of producing subpoenaed evidence rather than in the contents of the evi-
dence itself, is only of relatively recent significance.
This Article will address the scope and consequences of a grant of immu-
nity where the privilege is so limited. Part I explores the development and ana-
lytical underpinnings of the current federal law on witness immunity. Part II
explains the act-of-production privilege as it has evolved in the recent fifth
amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other courts.
Part III examines several existing theories of the scope of the immunity con-
ferred upon a witness validly exercising an act-of-production privilege. Part IV
proposes an alternative approach to the problem of defining the nature and con-
sequences of act-of-production immunity.
I. IMMUNITY
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
"[n]o person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."1 This privilege to remain silent extends only to the avoidance
of criminally inculpating oneself.2 By removing any realistic danger of self-in-
crimination, the state may remove the basis for the privilege itself.3 It is by this
rationale that a grant of immunity enables the government to compel testimony
that would otherwise have been privileged.
Naturally, the question that arises is what must be immunized in order to
overcome the bar against compelled self-incrimination. Because it is a constitu-
tional privilege that is at stake, it seems manifest that the protections provided
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by the grant of immunity must be coextensive with the rights afforded by the
privilege itself. Unremarkably, the Court has so indicated on several occasions.4
That truism has not produced any easy consensus on the issue of what form
immunity must take to be in fact coextensive with the privilege. Although there
were some British antecedents, 5 the first federal immunity statute in this coun-
try was not enacted until 1857.6 That statute provided for "transactional immu-
nity,"17 whereby the testifying witness is immunized from prosecution "for any
act or transaction about which he might testify.""
Five years later, that statute was amended9 to provide only for "use immu-
nity," 10 a more limited form of immunity. Use immunity permits later prosecu-
tion of the immunized witness, providing that the witness's immunized testi-
mony is not to be used against that witness." Because the provision of use
immunity does not require forfeiture of the ability to prosecute the witness, the
granting of use immunity is potentially less costly to the government than the
granting of transactional immunity. Consequently, in 1868, Congress enacted a
general use immunity statute covering all witnesses testifying in federal judicial
proceedings." It was this statute, as later revised, that provided the United
States Supreme Court with the opportunity to address the constitutional suffi-
ciency of use immunity.' 3
In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 4 the Court struck down as unconstitutional
the governing use immunity statute. Starting with the premise that a constitu-
4. E.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254 (1983) ("any grant of immunity must be coextensive
with the privilege"); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 124 (1980) ("grant of immunity [must] be
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege"); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972) ("immu-
nity granted [must be] coextensive with the scope of the privilege"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
54 (1964) ("grant of immunity is valid only if it is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation"); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 565 (1892) ("protection of [immunity statute must be] coex-
tensive with the constitutional provision").
5. The power to compel testimony dates at least as far back as 1562, Note, Federal Witness Immunity
Problems and Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1976) [hereinafter Note,
Federal Witness Immunity Problems], and the first statute authorizing grants of immunity to effect the power to
compel testimony was enacted in 1710, Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571 n.13 (1963) [hereinafter Note, The Federal
Witness Immunity Acts].
6. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, II Stat. 156.
7. "[N]o person examined and testifying before either House of Congress, or any committee of either
House, shall be held to answer criminally in any court of justice, or subject [sic] to any penalty or forfeiture for
any fact or act touching which he shall be required to testify .... " Id.
8. Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination: the
Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MERCER L. REV. 633, 636 (1979) [hereinafter
Mykkeltvedt I]. See also Feldman & Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming Rejection of Use
and Derivative Use Immunity, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 229, 230 (1986).
9. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
10. "[T]he testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of Congress, or any commit-
tee of either House of Congress, shall not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against such witness in
any court of justice .... " Id.
11. L. TAYLOR, WITNESS IMMUNITY 73, 79 (1983); Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems, supra note 5,
at 277. Use immunity is thus less extensive than transactional immunity. A witness who receives use immunity
may be subsequently prosecuted for the act or transaction that was the subject of his immunized testimony,
provided that the witness's own testimony is not used against him.
12. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
13. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 560-61, 564 (1892).
14. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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tionally sufficient grant of immunity must provide protection coextensive with
the Constitution itself, 5 the Court found use immunity deficient when measured
against the guarantees of the fifth amendment. That amendment is violated if
the defendant is compelled to furnish any link in the chain of evidence estab-
lishing his criminal culpability."6 While the use immunity statute in question
barred direct use of the immunized testimony, it did not preclude the govern-
ment from making derivative use of such testimony, i.e., of "gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may
supply other means of convicting the witness or party."'" The use-immunized
witness is thus compelled to provide the government with evidentiary leads that
might ultimately culminate in the witness's own conviction. 8 The witness com-
pelled to testify under a grant of use immunity is consequently in an inferior
position to the witness whose silence is secured by the fifth amendment. The
inadequacy of use immunity as a substitute for that silence required the consti-
tutional condemnation of that form of immunity.
The Court might (and arguably should) have stopped at that point. The
case required no more than the declaration that use immunity is constitutionally
deficient for its failure to protect the witness from derivative use of his testi-
mony. Nevertheless, the Court reached further to announce that only full trans-
actional immunity would be a constitutionally sufficient substitute for the fifth
amendment right of silence.' 9
In response to Counselman's dictum, the next seventy-eight years produced
a variety of federal immunity statutes, each conferring transactional immu-
nity.20 During this time, the Court was rarely called upon to address the consti-
tutionality of these various immunity provisions. 2' Nevertheless, the essential
15. Id. at 565.
16. Id. at 566. See also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Lushing, supra note 3, at
1702-08.
17. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 586.
18. In the words of the Counselman opinion,
[use immunity] protected [the witness] against the use of his testimony against him or his property in any
prosecution against him or his property, in any criminal proceeding, in a court of the United States. But it
had only that effect. It could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding in such court. It
could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable di-
rectly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when other-
wise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been convicted.
Id. at 564.
19. We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the [in]criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional provision, a statu-
tory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to
which the question relates.
Id. at 585-86. See also Mykkeltvedt I, supra note 8, at 636-38.
20. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447 (1972). See also Mykkeltvedt I, supra note 8, at 642;
Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or Obiter Dicta?: The Supreme Court and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15
GA. L. REv. 311, 318 (1981) [hereinafter Mykkeltvedt I!]; Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems, supra
note 5, at 278; Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts, supra note 5, at 1570, 1611-12.
21. The constitutional sufficiency of transactional immunity was specifically established in Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896). Brown rejected the contention that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is absolute and cannot be overcome by a grant of immunity in any form. Id. at 610; but see id. at 610-28 (Shiras,
J., dissenting).
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requirement of Counselman-that any derivative use of immunized testimony is
constitutionally impermissible-was not forgotten.22
Meanwhile, the availability of transactional immunity as an investigative
tool was proving to be of limited practical significance. A witness testifying
under a grant of transactional immunity would have every incentive to testify as
to every prior criminal transgression, thereby securing immunity from prosecu-
tion for every subject of his or her testimony. Apparently as a result of this high
cost of extending complete transactional immunity, such grants of immunity
were rarely utilized as an investigative device.23
In 1970, Congress enacted an entirely new federal immunity statute.2' In
place of a variety of ad hoc transactional immunity provisions, 25 a general "use/
derivative use" immunity statute was substituted.2 6
Use/derivative use immunity, like the simple use immunity found constitu-
tionally lacking in Counselman,2 7 proscribes direct use of the immunized testi-
mony against the witness in a criminal prosecution. It goes further, however. In
an attempt to avoid the defects specified in Counselman, use/derivative use im-
munity also proscribes indirect use of the immunized testimony, such as the use
of any evidence discovered by the government "through an investigative lead
supplied by the witness during his immunized testimony." 28 Thus, use/deriva-
tive use immunity provides greater protections for the immunized witness than
mere use immunity. On the other hand, it is theoretically less costly (and hence
more attractive) to the government than transactional immunity because it still
permits prosecution of the immunized witness for crimes which are the subject
of the immunized testimony.
In searching for a form of immunity that would both satisfy the Coun-
selman requirements and relieve the government of the burden of granting full
transactional immunity,29 the drafters of the 1970 statute were not without his-
22. E.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965) (any immunity statute which
"does not preclude the use of the admission as an investigatory lead ... is barred by the privilege"); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) ("witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be
incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by
federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him") (emphasis added).
23. Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems, supra note 5, at 278.
24. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 926-28 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1985)).
25. The legislative history of the new immunity statute details the piecemeal development prior to the 1970
legislation. See 2 Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 1409-11
(1970) [hereinafter Working Papers].
26. Working Papers, supra note 25, at 1405; Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems, supra note 5, at
279. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 [hereinafter Section 6003] sets forth the procedure by which the Government may obtain a
court order compelling a person who asserts his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or provide other
information. In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 [hereinafter Section 6002] provides that "no testimony or other informa-
tion compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order."
27. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
28. L. TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 79.
29. The legislative history of Section 6002 recognizes that,
[h]istorieally, two conflicting considerations underlie the drafting and revision of immunity statutes. One
consideration is that the immunity conferred leaves the witness, who is compelled to make a disclosure
under pain of contempt punishment, in the same position insofar as possible as though his right of silence
[Vol. 52:223
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torical guidance. Three items in particular were of historical significance in de-
fining the perimeters of this new concept. First, Counselman itself, stripped of
its dicta insisting upon transactional immunity, had focused upon derivative use
of immunized testimony as the constitutional infirmity of simple use
immunity.30
Second, some six years prior to the enactment of the new immunity statute,
the Court had specifically bestowed its constitutional blessing upon use/deriva-
tive use immunity, at least in a limited context. In Murphy v. Waterfront Com-
mission,31 the Court resolved the question of "whether one jurisdiction within
our federal structure may compel a witness, whom it has immunized from pros-
ecution under its laws, to give testimony which might then be used to convict
him of a crime against another such jurisdiction." 32
The question could have been resolved in any one of several fashions. The
Court might have ruled that the risk of self-incrimination leading to prosecution
by another jurisdiction was too insubstantial to warrant fifth amendment pro-
tection. But that result, by placing the immunized witness in an inferior position
to one lawfully maintaining silence in reliance upon the privilege, would have
failed to satisfy the fundamental principle that "a grant of immunity is valid
only if it is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination."'33
Alternatively, the Court might have simply recognized that the risk of
prosecution by another sovereign justified the post-immunity assertion of the
privilege. But that conclusion would have rendered immunity grants practically
worthless. Unless the jurisdiction extending the immunity grant could obtain
the concession of all other relevant jurisdictions to forego prosecution of the
immunized witness,34 then the immunized witness could still refuse to testify in
reliance upon the privilege.
under a proper plea of the privilege against compulsory self incrimination had been left undisturbed. The
second consideration is that grants of immunity be as narrow and precise as possible so as to minimize the
upsetting effect on the law enforcement activity of either the Federal or State governments.
Working Papers, supra note 25, at 1412.
30. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; Working Papers, supra note 25, at 1407.
31. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
32. Id. at 53. In fact, the petitioners in Murphy were granted immunity under state law and subsequently
refused to answer questions from state investigators on the grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate
them under federal law. Id. at 53-54. But the issue presented to the Court in Murphy was essentially the same as
if a federally immunized witness refused to respond to federal questioning for fear of self-incrimination leading to
state prosecution. Id. at 53 n.l. The same day that the Murphy opinion was announced, the Court, in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is, by virtue of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, applicable in state proceedings, id. at 8, and that the standards
for determining the validity of claims of the privilege in state proceedings are identical to those commanded by the
fifth amendment in federal proceedings, id. at I1. Thus, the constitutional sufficiency and consequences of state
immunity grants must meet the requirements imposed by Counselman upon federal grants of immunity.
33. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 54. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Indeed, given the substantial overlap
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction, see Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes. and Federalism, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (1987), the risk of cross-jurisdictional self-incrimination cannot fairly be regarded
as insubstantial.
34. After Counselman, and prior to the enactment of Section 6002, immunity occurred in the form of full
transactional immunity. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court might have given extraterritorial effect to the grant of
immunity, ruling that one jurisdiction's conferral of transactional immunity
would shield the witness from prosecution by all other jurisdictions as well. This
approach would have preserved both the fifth amendment rights of the immu-
nized witness and the investigative utility of the grant of immunity. However, to
the extent that immunity took the form of complete transactional immunity, the
Court quite understandably was reluctant to permit a jurisdiction, by a grant of
immunity, unilaterally to prevent every other jurisdiction from prosecuting the
witness for related crimes.35
None of these approaches presented a satisfactory solution to the situation
where a witness immunized by one jurisdiction fears self-incrimination contrib-
uting to his prosecution in another jurisdiction. What was needed was a result
which would preserve the legitimate interests of the immunized witness, the im-
munizing jurisdiction, and all other jurisdictions. That objective was accom-
plished by the adoption of use/derivative use immunity:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to im-
plement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Fed-
eral Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government
must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits.
This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure information necessary for
effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government in substan-
tially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a
state grant of immunity.38
The beauty of this approach is that, at least theoretically, it avoids all of
the glaring defects of the several alternatives discussed above. Because no juris-
diction may make direct or indirect use of the immunized testimony, the immu-
nized witness suffers no risk of being compelled to contribute to his own demise
in a prosecution by a non-immunizing jurisdiction.3 7 Because the immunized
witness has no legitimate fear of self-incrimination and thus no privilege to re-
fuse to testify, the immunizing jurisdiction is able to compel his testimony in
consideration for the grant of immunity. And because other, non-immunizing
jurisdictions remain free to prosecute the immunized witness solely on the basis
of evidence not derived from his immunized testimony, the grant of immunity
35. The consequences of such a rule could have been disastrous. Suppose, for example, that state police
officers were to arrest an individual for possession of a small quantity of cocaine. Believing this individual to be a
relatively insignificant offender, state prosecutors extend transactional immunity to this individual in exchange for
testimony concerning his drug sources. Unbeknownst to the state officials, federal agents and prosecutors are in
the process of investigating a large-scale cocaine distribution organization in which that same individual is a major
figure. A rule giving extraterritorial effect to the state's grant of immunity would insulate this individual from all
federal charges relating to the subject of his immunized testimony.
Precisely for these reasons, the decision to immunize "is peculiarly an executive one . Pillsbury Co. v.
Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983), and the Court undoubtedly had no appetite for judicial resolution of the
competing law enforcement interests of separate jurisdictions.
36. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
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by one jurisdiction does not interfere with the prosecutive prerogatives of other
jurisdictions.
Of course, the acceptability of use/derivative use immunity in Murphy was
virtually necessitated by the context of the issue presented in that case. The
problem for the Court was to preserve the legitimate interests of three compo-
nent groups: immunized witnesses, immunizing jurisdictions, and other jurisdic-
tions. There simply was no alternative to use/derivative use immunity that
would not have unacceptably sacrificed at least one of these interests.
But if use/derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient in this cir-
cumstance, then why would it be unacceptable in any other context? Did not
Murphy necessarily reject the Counselman dicta requiring transactional immu-
nity?38 The drafters of Section 6002 certainly thought so, relying upon Murphy
to defend the constitutional sufficiency of use/derivative use immunity.3 9
Third, to the extent that the objective of use/derivative use immunity is to
preserve the pre-immunity relationship between the government and the immu-
nized witness,40 there already existed a parallel model in the law of constitu-
tional criminal procedure. Generally, where law enforcement authorities obtain
evidence in violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the
defendant is not as a consequence deemed to be immune from prosecution. The
defendant may still be prosecuted on the basis of evidence derived indepen-
dently of the unlawful police conduct.,"
However, an illegally-obtained confession results in the suppression not
only of the confession itself, but also of evidence derived directly from the con-
fession.' 2 This truism is but a particular manifestation of the "fruits of the poi-
sonous tree" doctrine.43 In the language of the metaphor, the evidence obtained
as a direct result of the illegal police conduct is referred to as the "poisonous
tree," while evidence derived therefrom is referred to as the "fruits."'4 If the
exclusionary rule were to apply only to the "poisonous tree" and not also to the
"fruits," then the deterrent value of suppression would be substantially
compromised.' 5
38. Indeed. Justice White, concurring in Murphy, expressed precisely that view. Id. at 104-05.
39. Working Papers, supra note 25, at 1423-25. For a further discussion of the impact of Murphy, see
BERGER, TAKING THE FIFrH 70-71 (1980).
40. Certainly this is precisely what the objective was. The Constitutuon demands no less than that the immu-
nized witness enjoy the same protections afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. But the drafters of Section 6002 envisioned that this principle could be accomplished without
providing the witness with the windfall of full transactional immunity. If, for example, prior to the granting of
immunity, the government had already developed its case against the witness, then allowing the prosecution of the
witness to go forward solely on the basis of this pre-immunity evidence (as well as post-immunity evidence derived
therefrom independently of the immunized testimony) would not violate the constitutional principle set forth
above. The task was to define the scope of immunity in such a way as to recreate circumstances as they would
have existed in the absence of the immunized testimony.
41. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL L. REv. 579, 588 (1968).
42. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485
(1963).
43. The phrase "fruits of the poisonous tree" was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United
States. 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
44. Pitler, supra note 41, at 581.
45. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Silverthorne Lumber is a perfect
illustration of this principle. There, federal officials, with neither a warrant nor probable cause, entered the de-
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The object of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine is to "restore[ ]
the situation that would have prevailed if the Government had itself obeyed the
law."'46 This is accomplished by allowing the prosecution to go forward, but
without the benefit of the illicitly acquired "poisonous tree" or the derivative
"fruits." 4
7
fendants' business premises and seized various documents. Id. at 390. The documents were ordered returned to the
defendants because of the illegal seizure. Id. at 391. However, the government, based solely upon its earlier in-
spection of the documents, caused grand jury subpoenas duces tecum to be issued to the defendants requiring the
production of the very same documents. Id. Judgments of contempt were entered against the defendants for re-
fusal to comply with the subpoenas and a subsequent court order. Id. at 390. Reversing those convictions, the
Court wrote:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this
does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the govern-
ment's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
Id. at 392. Without the suppression of the "fruits" (in Silverthorne Lumber the evidence to be produced in
response to the subpoenas), a calculating police officer would still have had a significant incentive to engage in the
illegal search of the office and seizure of the documents.
46. Harrison, 392 U.S. at 224 n.10 ("exclusion of evidence causally linked to the Government's illegal activ-
ity no more than restores the situation that would have prevailed if the Government had itself obeyed the law").
See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) ("the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it
would have been in if no illegality had transpired").
47. The discussion in the text may suggest that the determination of what constitutes the excluded "fruits" is
simply a matter of establishing a logical, or but-for, causal relationship between the "fruits" and the "poisonous
tree" itself. Such is not the case. The Court has frequently eschewed the notion that a mere but-for relationship
between the "fruits" and the "poisonous tree" is sufficient for suppression of the "fruits." E.g., Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217 (1979); United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268, 274 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). Instead, the Court has
admitted the "fruits" where the "connection [has] become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See also Note, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and
Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 845-46 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Illegally Acquired Information]. The
test has been "'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.'" Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, quoting from J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221
(1959).
Extracting practical guidelines from such platitudes has been neither simple nor terribly satisfying. Questions
based upon illegally seized evidence are certainly a derivative use of the illegal search. United States v, Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). It is also relatively clear that an incriminatory admission following on the heels of an
illegal arrest will be suppressed as the "fruits of the poisonous tree," as a statement under such circumstances
cannot fairly be regarded as "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486. Moreover, the provision of Miranda warnings between the illegal arrest and the
inculpatory admissions, although a relevant factor, does not in and of itself constitute the attenuation necessary for
the admissibility of the statements. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975). Instead the Court has looked to
such factors as the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances
and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982); Rawlings,
448 U.S. at 107-10; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218; Brown, 422 U.S at 603-04. See also Note, Illegally Acquired
Information, supra, at 854-55. By contrast, an independently reliable in-court identification is per se not the
tainted "fruits" of an illegal arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
It has been suggested that, unlike the situation where the "poisonous tree" is a fourth amendment violation,
fifth amendment violations may yield little or no opportunity for the government to attenuate the taint in order to
accomplish admissibility of derivative fruits. Pitler, supra note 41, at 620. Note, Standards for Exclusion in
Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE UJ. 171, 176-78 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Standards for
Exclusion]. Support for that proposition may arguably be found in Harrison, 392 U.S. at 219. In Harrison, the
defendant's first conviction was reversed because the Government had introduced illegally obtained confessions in
its case in chief. Id. at 220. On retrial, the Government introduced the defendant's trial testimony from the first
trial. Id. at 221. Because the circumstances indicated that the defendant's original trial testimony had been of-
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The parallel between the coerced confession and immunity scenarios is
manifest. In both situations, the government compels the individual to incrimi-
nate him or herself. In the case of the coerced confession, the law generally
precludes the government from making any evidentiary or investigatory use of
the self-incriminatory revelations, but it does not bar prosecution entirely. If
such an after-the-fact remedy is constitutionally sufficient when the government
behaves unlawfully, why must the greater restriction of barring prosecution al-
together be placed upon the government when it proceeds properly with a grant
of immunity? The irony of transactional immunity is that the government may
be tactically in a better position after coercing a confession in a police station
than it is after immunizing testimony before a grand jury.48
The parallel between the coerced confession and immunity situations, and
the ironic overinclusiveness of transactional immunity, were not lost upon at
least one member of the Court.49 So too the drafters of Section 6002 were
aware of the coerced confession model, and referred to the exclusionary remedy
in that context as "[u]nintentional immunity."' 0 The legislative history makes
clear that Section 6002 immunity was to be of the "same scope as that fre-
quently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional
violations by law enforcement officers."'"
The judgment of the proponents of Section 6002 was vindicated a short
time after its enactment in Kastigar v. United States.5' There the Court re-
jected a constitutional attack upon Section 6002 and endorsed the constitutional
sufficiency of use/derivative use immunity. The Court found use/derivative use
immunity, as specified in Section 6002, to be "coextensive with the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination,' '53 because it "leaves the witness and the
fered to counteract the confessions, the Court ruled that the defendant's testimony at his first trial was itself the
tainted "fruits" of the illegally obtained confession. Id. at 223-26.
By contrast, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court held that an otherwise voluntary confession
acquired in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not taint a subsequent confession made
after the provision of Miranda warnings. The difficulty in reconciling Elstad with other decisions in the "fruits of
the poisonous trce" area can perhaps, at least in part, be attributed to the Court's growing disaffection for Mi-
randa itself. See Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent Crimi-
nal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 472 (1985).
Finally, where the "fruits" sought to be suppressed consist of the testimony of a witness (in the sense that the
government learns of the existence or significance of a witness as a result of unlawful conduct), as opposed to
tangible evidence, "a closer, more direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required" for
exclusion. Ceccalini, 435 U.S. at 278. The Court's greater willingness to find attenuation dissipating the taint in
this context is based upon: (I) the likelihood that a witness is willing to testify freely, purging the causal relation-
ship to the prior illegality, id. at 276-77, and (2) the catastrophic consequence of permanently disqualifying a
witness from testifying, even as to matters unrelated to the prior illegality, id. at 277.
48. See Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment. 66 TEx. L.
REV. 351, 357 (1987).
49. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 102-03 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
50. WorkIng Papers, supra note 25, at 1419.
51. Id. at 1446. See also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 276-77 & n.2 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
52. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
53. Id. at 453. The Court stated that transactional immunity affords "considerably broader protection than
does the Fifth Amendment privilege," id., and that any indication to the contrary in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), discussed supra at notes 14-19 and accompanying text, was nonbinding dicta, id. at 453-55.
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prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.""'
The Court acknowledged that the protection against both use and deriva-
tive use of immunized testimony is "analogous" to the exclusionary remedy in
cases of coerced confessions. " However, it is by no means clear that the "atten-
uation" doctrine 6 limits the exclusionary principle as applied to evidence de-
rived from immunized testimony. It has been widely suggested that it should
not, first, because the justification for the scope of immunity, unlike the exclu-
sionary rule remedy, does not depreciate in relation to the decreasing efficacy of
deterring police misconduct, and second, because allowing even attenuated de-
rivative evidence would violate the principle that the scope of immunity must be
coextensive with the privilege itself.5 7
That conclusion finds considerable support in the Kastigar opinion. There,
the Court noted that Section 6002 imposes a "total prohibition on use,"58 "as-
suring that the compelled testimony can in no way lead to the infliction of crim-
inal penalties." 59 This includes "barring the use of compelled testimony as an
'investigatory lead,' and also barring the use of any evidence obtained by focus-
ing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures." 60 The
Kastigar Court further placed upon the government "the heavy burden of prov-
54. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
55. Id. at 461.
56. The "attenuation" doctrine permits the admission of some derivative evidence where the causal connec-
tion to the official illegality is so "attenuated" as to have "dissipated the taint" of such evidence. Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The doctrine is more fully discussed, supra note 47.
57. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 497 F.
Supp. 979, 983-84 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 Tax. L. REV.
791, 829-30 (1978); L. TAYLOR, supra note 11, at App. B, 173-77; Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity
Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350, 378-79 (1973); Note, The Fifth
Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL L. REv. 470, 488-
89 (1974); Note, Standards for Exclusion, supra note 47, at 178-81.
In Kurzer, the Court reasoned that, where the government learns of the identity and significance of a witness
from immunized testimony, that witness may not be used in a prosecution of the immunized party. 534 F.2d at
516-17. This is in stark contrast to the situation where a witness is the "fruit" of a fourth amendment violation.
See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). discussed supra at note 47.
That contrast is apparent elsewhere as well. Immunized testimony may not be used to impeach the immu-
nized witness. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456-60 (1979). However, evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment, while inadmissible as substantive evidence, is admissible to impeach the defendant's testimony.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). So too evidence
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is admissible for the purpose of impeachment.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
58. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
59. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 460 (footnote omitted). Plainly this proscription bars the use of immunized testimony to develop
other evidence against the immunized witness. It also appears that the prohibition against derivative use covers
nonevidentiary uses, such as focusing the investigation upon certain persons or subjects, deciding to initiate prose-
cution, refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, planning trial strategy, and preparing cross-examination.
See. e.g., United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716,
723 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenter,
611 F. Supp. 768, 779-80 (N.D. Ga. 1985); United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-22 (D.N.J. 1984).
But see United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (provided all evidence presented to grand
jury independent of immunized testimony, irrelevant that immunized testimony may have influenced decision to
indict); Humble, supra note 48 (arguing for limitation of "derivative use" to evidentiary uses). The Department of
Justice guidelines indicate that, in a subsequent prosecution of an immunized witness, "[t]he government will...
have to show that it has made no 'non-evidentiary' use of the testimony or its fruits, such as a decision to focus on
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ing that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate inde-
pendent sources." 61 "This burden of proof . . . is not limited to a negation of
taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the
evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly indepen-
dent of the compelled testimony.16 2
Beyond the broad proscriptions of Kastigar, the Court has not yet specifi-
cally addressed the possible application of the "attenuation" doctrine to the
fruits of immunized testimony. It is certainly possible that at some point the
causal relationship between the immunized testimony and the derivative evi-
dence may become so imperceptible that the evidence may be deemed "wholly
independent" of that testimony. The difference, then, between "wholly indepen-
dent" and "attenuated" is simply one of degree. 3 It is certainly fair to say that
the scope of the ban against evidence derived from immunized testimony is at
least as broad, and quite possibly broader, than the scope of the ban on evidence
derived from officially coerced confessions.
In any event, the burden upon the government to demonstrate that none of
its evidence was derived from the defendant's immunized testimony is extremely
difficult. 6" In practice, then, very few immunized witnesses are subsequently
prosecuted for crimes relating to the subject matter of their immunized testi-
mony.65 One commentator has suggested that use/derivative use immunity in
practice is virtually indistinguishable from transactional immunity.66 Naturally,
then, a prosecutor is unlikely to extend immunity to an individual unless the
prosecutor is virtually certain that he or she will not prosecute that individual in
the witness as a potential defendant." UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-23.330 (1988) [hereinafter
MANUAL].
An example of this absolute proscription of any derivative use is In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 497 F. Supp.
979 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In that case, an individual named Rosenthal, called to testify as a witness in a bankruptcy
proceeding, was ordered to testify by the bankruptcy court pursuant to a then-existing statute conferring auto-
matic use/derivative use immunity upon such witnesses. Following the testimony, the bankruptcy court directed
the bankruptcy trustee to apprise the office of the United States Attorney of potential criminal violations, which
the trustee did. In an effort to avoid future taint problems, the prosecutor was not advised as to the content of
Rosenthal's immunized testimony or of the basis for the bankruptcy judge's referral. An investigation was com-
menced, which eventually led back to Rosenthal. A grand jury subpoena was served upon Rosenthal seeking
handwriting exemplars for the purpose of identifying the author of certain writings. The district court granted
Rosenthal's motion to quash the subpoena, finding that the investigation underlying the subpoena was itself a
derivative use of Rosenthal's immunized testimony. Id. at 985-89.
61. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62.
62. Id. at 460.
63. Humble, supra note 48, at 362 n.63.
64. Lushing, supra note 3, at 1713-14; Note, Prospective Determinations of Derived Use in Civil Proceed-
ings: Upsetting the Immunity Balance, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 998-99 (1982). That showing is typically made
at a pretrial hearing, United States v. First W. State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 787-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 825 (1974); Lushing, supra note 3, at 1692, and is sometimes referred to as a Kastigar showing or a showing
made at a Kastigar hearing. Thus, unless and until the government commences a prosecution of the immunized
witness, the showing required by Kastigar need never be made. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179, 181
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wiggins v. United States, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
65. Alito, Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 55-56 (1986);
Mykkeltvedt II, supra note 20, at 335; Mykkeltvedt i, supra note 8, at 655-57; Note, Federal Witness Immunity
Problems, supra note 5, at 282. See also MANUAL, supra note 60, at 9-23.000 (describing as "rare case[s] where
it can be shown that the supporting evidence clearly was obtained only from independent sources") (emphasis
added).
66. Mykkeltvedt i, supra note 8, at 659.
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the future for crimes relating to the scope of the immunized testimony. 7 In
short, use/derivative use immunity, consistent with the vision of the authors and
proponents of Section 6002 and the Kastigar Court, has not functioned as a
vehicle for prosecutors to compel testimony from the very individuals who are
targeted for prosecution.
Finally, the most pertinent lesson from this history is that use/derivative
use immunity is clearly as far as the government may constitutionally go. Kasti-
gar makes clear that use/derivative use immunity is merely coextensive with,
and not broader than, what the fifth amendment permits .6 Although the dicta
in Counselman requiring transactional immunity is no longer controlling, the
actual holding of Counselman-that any immunity which permits derivative use
of immunized testimony is unconstitutional 6 -- remains valid.
II. THE ACT-OF-PRODUCTION PRIVILEGE
Although references to an act-of-production privilege do appear in some
earlier Supreme Court opinions,7 0 that concept did not assume true significance
until the Court's 1976 decision in Fisher v. United States.71 In Fisher, certain
taxpayers, the targets of tax investigations, had obtained their accountants'
work papers which had been used to prepare their tax returns.72 The targets
then transferred the papers to their respective attorneys.73 The Government
sought to compel the production of these documents by summonses served upon
the attorneys.74 The attorneys refused to comply, raising various challenges to
the summonses, including a claim that production would violate the targets'
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 5
Insofar as the summonses sought to compel attorneys to produce docu-
ments provided to them by clients seeking legal services, the Court examined
the potential application of the attorney-client privilege. The question addressed
was whether the privileged status of the documents is altered by virtue of their
transfer from client to attorney. Essentially, the fact that documents have been
transferred to an attorney neither enlarges nor diminishes the client's privilege.
If production of the documents could have been obtained directly from the cli-
ent, then transfer of the documents to legal counsel does not create a privi-
lege-attorney-client or otherwise-against compelled production by the attor-
ney.7 '6 However, if production of the documents could not have been obtained
67. Alito, supra note 65, at 56; Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 488 (1984); Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business
Documents, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 387, 443 (1987). See also Carlson, Witness Immunity in Modern Trials: Observa-
tions on the Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, 67 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 131, 134 (1976).
68. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
69. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564-66, 586 (1892).
70. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 346-47 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
71. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
72. Id. at 394.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 394-95.
75. Id. at 395.
76. Id. at 403-04.
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directly from the client, then the attorney-client privilege protects the docu-
ments from compelled production following transfer of the documents to
counsel.7
The real question, then, is whether individuals (in Fisher, the targets) en-
joy a fifth amendment privilege against the compelled production of documents
within their personal possession. This inquiry provided the vehicle for the Fisher
Court to lay the groundwork for its act-of-production analysis.
Starting with the language of the fifth amendment itself, 8 the Court rea-
soned that the privilege against self-incrimination may only be invoked where
each of three elements is present: compulsion, testimony,79 and incrimination."0
Insofar as a target is subpoenaed to produce his accountant's work papers, the
element of incrimination may well be present.81 However, as the work papers
are neither created nor adopted by the target, the papers do not constitute the
testimony of the target. Thus, the incriminatory aspect of the documents does
not run afoul of the fifth amendment, because the papers themselves do not
constitute a testimonial communication by the target.82
More importantly, even if the documents are created by the target, and
thus can be fairly said to constitute a testimonial communication, the element
of governmental compulsion is lacking. Typically, as in Fisher, the documents
are created voluntarily and not as a result of governmental subpoena or other
coercive mechanisms. Thus, the contents of the documents, even though consti-
77. Id. at 404-05.
78. US. CoNsT. amend. V provides in relevant part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ....
79. Historically, the fifth amendment has not barred compelling a person to provide nontestimonial self-
incriminating evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966), the Court endorsed the inter-
pretation of the fifth amendment which offered protection against compelled "'communications' or 'testimony.'"
but not against the compelled production of "real or physical evidence." On the basis of this distinction, one may
be constitutionally compelled, for example, to provide handwriting exemplars, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19,
21-22 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1966); to provide voice exemplars, United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1. 5-7 (1973); to stand in a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967); to
provide blood samples, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765; to don incriminating clothing, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 252-53 (1910); to submit to fingerprinting, e.g., United States v. Peters, 687 F.2d 1295, 1297 (10th Cir.
1982); to submit to photographing, e.g., In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1982), and to provide hair
samples, id.
The universe of nontestimonial self-incrimination is not limited to physical evidence. Although most verbal
statements are testimonial, Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988), "in order to be testimonial, an
accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." Id.
at 210 (footnote omitted). In Doe, the Court found no fifth amendment violation in a court order (and a subse-
quent civil contempt order) requiring a target to execute a consent directive directing foreign banks to release to
the investigating grand jury the bank records of the target's accounts. The consent directive did not identify any
accounts or banks or even acknowledge the existence of any such accounts. Id. at 215. Thus, neither the directive
nor the compelled act of the target's execution of the directive required the target to communicate any informa-
tion or assert any facts. Id. at 215-16. Nothing in the compelled words of the target constituted an implicit
admission by the target as to the existence, possession, or authentication of such bank records; there simply was no
communicative quality to the execution of the directive.
For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial self-incrimination,
see, Arcnella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 31,
38-45 (1982); Lushing, supra note 3, at 1699-701.
80. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391, 408.
81. Id. at 409.
82. Id.
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tuting testimonial self-incrimination, are generally not shielded by the fifth
amendment because of the absence of the element of official compulsion. 83
This does not end the inquiry, however. Where an individual produces doc-
uments in response to a subpoena or a summons, there is clearly present the
element of compulsion.84 What is compelled is not the creation of the docu-
ments, but rather their production. The question, then, is whether the compelled
act of producing evidence satisfies the testimonial and self-incriminatory prongs
of the Court's fifth amendment analysis.
In Fisher, the Court identified three potential testimonial aspects of the act
of production of documents. First, production may constitute implicit testimony
by the subpoenaed party that the documents in question do in fact exist.85 Sec-
ond, production may constitute implicit testimony that subpoenaed documents
had been in the possession of that party.8 And third, production may constitute
implicit authentication of the documents, i.e., production may communicate the
subpoenaed party's belief that the documents produced are those demanded by
the subpoena.8 7
The mere presence of one or more of these implicit communications does
not, however, necessarily render the act of production "sufficiently testimonial"
to "rise[] to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment."' 88 According to the Fisher Court, where the relevant testimonial compo-
nent-existence, possession, or authentication-is a "foregone conclusion," then
the testimonial aspect of the act of production is not protected by the fifth
amendment.8 9 The measure of whether the testimonial component is a "fore-
gone conclusion" is whether the act of production "adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government's information..."9'
If, despite these obstacles, the act of production is sufficiently testimonial to
meet that threshold of fifth amendment coverage, there remains the third prong
of the Court's test: whether the act of production is self-incriminatory. In
Fisher, the Court found this element lacking because: (1) there had been no
showing that existence or possession of the papers was actually incriminatory,
and (2) the taxpayers were not competent to authenticate the work papers of
83. Id. at 409-10 & n.l1; Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1277 (1988).
Fisher's analysis regarding the contents of voluntarily prepared documents reemerged two months later in Andre-
sen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In Andresen, the question was whether the seizure of the defendant's
personal business records pursuant to a search warrant, and the introduction of those records against the defend-
ant at trial, violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 465. Applying the
three-part test utilized in Fisher, the Court acknowledged that the records were both testimonial and incriminat-
ing. Id. at 471. However, because the records had been created voluntarily, the element of compulsion was lack-
ing. Id. at 473. Indeed, because the records were lawfully seized, and were not the subject of a subpoena directed
to the defendant, the defendant had not been compelled to do anything whatsoever. Id. at 474. Thus, no privilege
attached to the records so obtained. Id. at 477.
84. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
85. Id. at 410.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 411.
89. Id.
90. Id. The meaning of the term "foregone conclusion" is discussed further infra at note 96.
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the accountants.9 1 The Court noted, however, that it was not faced with the
issue of determining whether a target could be compelled to produce his own
papers in his own possession."2
Fisher thus introduced the following methodology for the analysis of claims
of fifth amendment privilege in response to document subpoenas:
First, the elements of compulsion, testimony and self-incrimination are all
prerequisites to the application of the fifth amendment;
Second, where documents are voluntarily created, the absence of the ele-
ment of compulsion precludes application of the fifth amendment to the con-
tents of those documents;
Third, where production of the documents is compelled, the act of produc-
tion is itself within the ambit of fifth amendment protection, provided that the
act of production is sufficiently testimonial and incriminatory;
Fourth, the act of production is testimonial where it implicitly communi-
cates existence, possession or authentication of the documents; and
Fifth, none of these communicative aspects of the act of production is suffi-
ciently testimonial to be covered by the fifth amendment privilege where the
relevant aspect is a "foregone conclusion. '93
On the other hand, Fisher left us with several major unresolved questions.
Does the Fisher analysis-which finds no privilege in the contents of voluntarily
created documents but rather only in the compelled act of their produc-
tion-apply only to ordinary business records or does it apply as well to private
business papers and even to nonbusiness personal documents?9" When is the act
of production sufficiently testimonial and incriminatory to trigger the applica-
91. Id. at 412-13.
92. Id. at 414.
93. While this analytical framework arose, and occurs most frequently, in the context of compelled document
production, it is not so limited. As the Court noted in Fisher, "fi]n the case of a documentary subpoena the only
thing compelled is the act of producing the document and the compelled act is the same as the one performed
when a chattel . . . is demanded." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 n.I I (citation omitted). Thus, several cases have
applied the Fisher analysis in determining whether a fifth amendment privilege exists in the compelled act of
production of other than documentary items. E.g., Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs v. Bouknight, I10 S. Ct. 900
(1990) (court-ordered production of child); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1979) (subpoena
to produce brass knuckles); Goldsmith v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1984) (sub-
poena to criminal defendant to produce firearm); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d 1239
(court order to criminal defendant to produce firearm), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); State v. Dennis, 16
Wash. App. 417, 558 P.2d 297 (1976) (production of cocaine at insistence of police officer). See also Lefstein,
Incriminating Physical Evidence, The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, and the Need for Rules, 64 N.C.L. REV. 897,
913 (1986); Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. I, 7
n.15 (1987).
94. The Court's opinion in Fisher specifically left this issue unresolved. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. Justice
Brennan authored a separate opinion primarily to limit his agreement with the majority only as to non-private
business papers, while distinguishing the contents of personal papers as protected under the fifth amendment. Id.
at 414-28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Eight years later, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), several members of the Court took the
opportunity to express their respective opinions on this issue, albeit in dicta. Justice O'Connor authored a separate
concurrence "just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis [of the majority] opinion: that the Fifth Amend-
ment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind." Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, took issue with Justice O'Connor's opinion, instead
concluding "that under the Fifth Amendment 'there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to
produce at the Government's request.'" Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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The argument that there remains a privilege as to the contents of some voluntarily-created documents stems
from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886), where the Court held that the compulsory production
of private books and papers violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The rationale of
Boyd, at least as read by Justice Brennan, was not that the act of production was the result of governmental
compulsion, but rather that the fifth amendment was designed to protect an individual's privacy, even as mani-
fested in the recordation of private thoughts. Id. at 631-32; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416, 420
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Alito, supra note 65, at 36 (rationale of Boyd was protection of private
property); Heidt, supra note 67, at 444-50 (same).
While Fisher did not expressly overrule Boyd, it did both question the continuing vitality of Boyd, 116 U.S.
at 407, and specifically reject the notion that the fifth amendment is designed to guarantee personal privacy, id. at
399; Heidt, supra note 67, at 442, 471-72. With the abandonment of this privacy rationale, and the substituted
focus upon the compelled act of production, the character of documents' contents should no longer be relevant. As
the Court reiterated in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 n.10 (1984), "[i]f the party asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the
document are not privileged."
Given the content-neutral analysis employed in both Fisher and Doe, several commentators have endorsed
Justice O'Connor's view that the privilege against self-incrimination provides no protection for any voluntarily-
prepared documents, including private papers. Alito, supra note 65, at 44, 54; Mosteller, supra note 93, at 5 &
n.10; Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REv.
383, 395-96 (1977); Trujillo, Are a Taxpayer's Private Papers Protected from an IRS Summons Under the Fifth
Amendment?, 59 TEtP. L.Q. 467, 484-85, 492, 495 (1986); Webb & Ferguson, United States v. Doe: The Su-
preme Court and the Fifth Amendment, 16 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 729, 739 (1985); Note, The Rights of Criminal
Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683,
692-94 (1982) [hereinafter Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants]; Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for
Producing Corporate Documents, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1544, 1563 (1986). See also Heidt, supra note 67, at 470-72.
The courts, however, have been more cautious. Several decisions have read Fisher (and the Court's later
opinion in Doe) as precluding any privilege in the contents of private business papers. E.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 265 (1989); United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d
1488, 1491 n.3, 1492 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 1986); In re
Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 355 (Ist Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings on February 4, 1982, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419
(9th Cir. 1985) ("[R]egardless of the precise characterization of the disputed papers, the contents of such docu-
ments are not privileged under the fifth amendment in the absence of some showing that creation of the docu-
ments was the product of compulsion." (citation omitted)); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1099 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (Ist Cir. 1980); In re Trader Roe, 720
F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. III. 1989) ("Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of any voluntarily prepared
records, regardless of their nature" (footnote omitted)); United States v. Cates, 686 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (D. Md.
1988); United States v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1220-22 (N.D. ILL.), aff'd, 815 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1987);
Moll v. United States Life Title Ins. Co., 113 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Willis, 565 F.
Supp. 1186, 1196 (S.D. Iowa 1983); In re January, 1986 Grand Jury, 155 Ill. App. 3d 445, 451, 508 N.E.2d 277,
280, appeal denied, 116 111. 2d 555, 515 N.E.2d 109 (1987). cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988). A few decisions
have fully embraced Justice O'Connor's view and rejected a claim of privilege as to the contents of voluntarily-
created, personal, non-business papers. E.g., State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 253, 255-56, 625
P.2d 316, 318-19 (1981) (personal letters); State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 190-91 (Iowa 1987) (personal
journals); State v. Jancsek, 302 Or. 270, 284-85, 730 P.2d 14, 23 (1986) (personal letter); Marano v. Holland,
366 S.E.2d 117, 129 (W. Va. 1988) (autobiography and other papers used for psychological evaluation).
However, some courts, in the absence of an express overruling of Boyd, have found some fifth amendment
protection for the contents of voluntarily-prepared, private papers. E.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028,
1042-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042-44 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 890, 892-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated May 9, 1990, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1068-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United
States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Katin, 109 F.R.D. 406,
409 (D. Mass. 1986); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Served February 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (E.D. Wash. 1984). These decisions are irreconcil-
able with the requirement that the privilege is only applicable in the face of some governmental compulsion. See
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10 & n.1 1. Moreover, the reliance upon Boyd for a distinction governing the contents of
private papers is questionable, for the document at issue in Boyd was an invoice for shipped merchandise, which
was hardly a private paper. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 618 (1886).
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tion of the fifth amendment?95 What showing must the government make to
establish that the testimonial aspect of the act of production is a "foregone
conclusion"? 96
95. If one conceptually isolates the implied testimonial aspect of the act of production (be it existence, pos-
session, authentication, or some combination of the three) from the unprivileged contents of the subpoenaed item,
the former is not independently incriminatory. In other words, the existence, possession, or authentication of a
completely vacuous item cannot be incriminating; it is always some character or content of the item that is
inculpatory.
However, the protection of the privilege extends even to compelled testimony which would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence used by the prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 566 (1892). This principle applies no less to the testimonial component of the act of
production. E.g., United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099
(1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980). Where the unprivileged contents of
an item are incriminating, the implicit testimony as to existence, possession, or authentication of that item may
well furnish an inculpatory link in the chain of evidence against the subpoenaed party.
The existence and authenticity of an item are both necessary links in the introduction of that item into
evidence. Consequently, where the contents of an item are incriminating, arguably the implicit testimony as to
existence or authenticity will inevitably be incriminatory. See, e.g., In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 358 (Ist Cir. 1985);
Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United States v. Fox, 721
F.2d 32, 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d at 1055-56; United States v. Katin, 109
F.R.D. 406, 409-10 (D. Mass. 1986). However, when the subpoena describes the subpoenaed item with such
particularity that responding is a purely ministerial task requiring no discrimination by the witness, it has been
suggested that there is no testimonial component of authentication. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 13-15. But see
Rothman, supra note 67, at 439 ("[S]ome identification and selection occurs in every instance. Even when just
one document is called for, veracity is critical because identification and selection are unsupervised.") In the event
that there is such a testimonially incriminating aspect of the act of production, whether it is sufficiently testimo-
nial to be privileged will depend upon whether the testimonial component (existence or authentication) is a "fore-
gone conclusion." See infra note 96.
Where the only testimonial aspect of the act of production is possession, the analysis is more complex. In
many cases, the incriminating character of the subpoenaed item is not affected by the target's possession of that
item. For example, a written or recorded confession, independently authenticated, does not gain or lose probative
value depending upon who is in possession of it. Thus, the implicit admission of possession will constitute testimo-
nial incrimination only where the fact of possession provides some incremental evidence of guilt. This will occur,
for example, where the possession of the item is itself illegal, where possession reveals control over the illegally
used item, e.g., State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Minn. 1979) (court may not order defendants to
produce allegedly obscene film in prosecution for exhibiting the film), where possession furthers the inference that
the target misappropriated the item to conceal it from the government, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 1983), or where possession supports
the inculpatory inference of receipt and knowledge of the contents of documents, e.g., In re Kave, 760 F.2d at 358;
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d at 987. Of course,
even where the implicit acknowledgment of possession constitutes testimonial incrimination in this preliminary
sense, the question remains whether possession is insufficiently testimonial because it is a "foregone conclusion."
See Infra note 96.
96. This is a question as to which there is considerable uncertainty. Alito, supra note 65, at 49; Mosteller,
supra note 93, at 3, 9. The sole explication of the concept in Fisher was that the implicit testimony inherent in the
act of production "add[ed] little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information. ... Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). The apparent focus of this inquiry is upon the incremental value of the
implicit testimony, which in turn depends upon the strength of the government's independent evidence regarding
the relevant testimonial component. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (govern-
ment must show "that it would be able to prove at trial by independent evidence any possibly incriminatory facts"
which are testimonially implicit in the act of production); United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1492 (8th Cir.
1987) ("foregone conclusion" analysis "focuses on the information possessed by the IRS regarding the existence,
possession, and authenticity of the summoned documents"); United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d
Cir. 1984) (whether government can compel production of documents depends "on the extent of the knowledge
the government can prove it possesses"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 13, 1984,
616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (no privilege if government can demonstrate that it already knows); In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served February 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1015-16 (E.D. Wash. 1984) (implicit
testimony is not a "foregone conclusion" if it conveys "information the government does not already have");
Heidt, supra note 67, at 480 (whether implicit admission is foregone conclusion is determined "in light of the
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Perhaps the most interesting issue raised by Fisher is nowhere discussed in
the Court's opinion. What are the consequences of a grant of use immunity to a
other evidence available to the prosecutor"); Mosteller, supra note 93, at 29 ("the extent of prosecutorial knowl-
edge provides the key to the question whether admission of existence through the act of production entails, in any
given case, testimonial conduct. That issue is directly addressed in the foregone conclusion concept created by the
Court in Fisher"); Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations on the Compelled Production of Evidence, 25 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 509, 514 (1988); Note, The Fifth Amendment and Production of Documents After United States v. Doe,
66 B.U.L. REV. 95, 116 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Fifth Amendment and Production] (foregone conclusion analy-
sis "link[s] the accused's ability to invoke the fifth amendment to the strength of the government's case"). The
Court apparently confirmed this analysis in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984), where it af-
firmed the lower court's finding that the Government's evidence was insufficient to establish that existence, posses-
sion, and authentication were a foregone conclusion.
The idea that the availability of the privilege would itself depend upon the availability of independent evi-
dence does not appear to have any historical basis, see Rothman, supra note 67, at 437, and in fact appears "to be
inconsistent with the settled understanding" that the privilege is not limited to merely noncumulative evidence,
Alito, supra note 65, at 49. Consequently, the "foregone conclusion" concept has drawn some criticism, both from
commentators, see, e.g., Heidt, supra note 67, at 476 n.151; Mosteller, supra note 93, at 31; Rothman, supra note
67, at 437-38; Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants, supra note 94, at 686-87, and from one member of the
Court.
I disagree, however, that implicit admission of the existence and possession or control of the papers in this
case is not "testimonial" merely because the Government could readily have otherwise proved existence
and possession or control in these cases. I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which makes the testi-
monial nature of evidence and, therefore, one's protection against incriminating himself, turn on the
strength of the Government's case against him.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 428-29 (Brennan, J., concurring).
To the extent that there is an analogue for the showing the government must make to establish that the
testimonial component is a foregone conclusion, it would be the Kastigar showing. See supra note 64 and accom-
panying text. In both cases the government must prove that its evidence is "independent" of the compelled testi-
mony. Cf. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 33-34.
There are, however, important differences. First, while the Kastigar showing is made after a privilege has
been recognized and immunity conferred, the foregone conclusion showing is made earlier, at the point when the
very existence of a privilege is being determined. Second, and perhaps as a corollary of the first distinction, there
is no indication that the strict proscription against derivative use governing the Kastigar showing plays any part in
the foregone conclusion analysis. See Mosteller, supra note 93, at 34 n.108. 38.
Why has the Court altered the traditional structure of fifth amendment analysis by inserting the foregone
conclusion loophole? It has been persuasively suggested that, where the government is solely interested in acquir-
ing the unprivileged contents of a subpoenaed item, and where the testimonial component is merely implicit and
inherently incidental to compliance with a subpoena duces tecum, the Court regards the testimonial component as
insufficiently related to the true goals of the subpoena to permit frustration of the legitimate acquisition of un-
privileged evidence. See Mosteller, supra note 93, at 32; Rothman, supra note 67, at 438. The focus, then, is upon
what is truly significant to the government when it serves the subpoena, i.e., what it will acquire that will be of
evidentiary significance. Heidt, supra note 67, at 481-82; Mosteller, supra note 93, at 38. See also United States
v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983) (testimonial component of act of production is foregone conclu-
sion where not "required" for government to introduce evidence), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); State v.
Jancsek, 302 Or. 270, 288, 730 P.2d 14, 25 (1986) (testimonial component of act of production is foregone
conclusion where "not necessary" to government's proof). Consistent with this interpretation, the government must
make no use of the testimonial component of the act of production, and in fact must demonstrate that it does not
need such testimony. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 32-33.
This is most clearly seen when the implicit testimonial component is authentication. Frequently, the govern-
ment does not need the authentication implicit in the act of production. Once the government actually has the
unprivileged item, there will be alternative means of authenticating the item independent of the act of production.
But see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982), afd in part, rev'd
in part, sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). Some courts and commentators have taken the
position that the government's ability to authenticate independently does not defeat a claim of privilege, see, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (1st Cir. 1980); Rothman, supra note 67, at 440, and that
a grant of immunity is necessary to compel production, Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants, supra note 94,
at 688-90. The prevailing view, however, appears to be that the government's specification of an alternative means
of authentication renders authentication a foregone conclusion. E.g., United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1473-
74 (10th Cir. 1988); United States See. and Exch. Comm. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 843 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.
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witness holding only an act-of-production privilege? What evidentiary use may
be made of the contents of evidence acquired pursuant to a grant of act-of-
production immunity?
9 7
Eight years after Fisher, in United States v. Doe,"8 the Court once again
addressed the subject of an act-of-production privilege. In Doe, several subpoe-
1988); Rue, 819 F.2d at 1494; United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1241 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985
(1986); Schlansky, 709 F.2d at 1083; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 13, 1984, 616
F. Supp. at 1161-62; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas served February 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. at 1016-17.
The latter position appears to have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in its most recent act of production
decision. In Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, I 10 S. Ct. 900 (1990), the Court addressed a claim of
act-of-production privilege in response to a juvenile court order to produce a child in the custody of the respon-
dent. In the course of its discussion, the Court noted that no privilege exists as to the "contents or the nature of
the thing demanded." Id. at 905. Therefore the respondent could not claim a privilege as to the existence or
authenticity of the child because both could be readily established by an examination of the child. Id.
Perhaps the most difficult and unsettled issue is the nature and quantity of the evidence that must be pro-
duced by the government in order to establish that the relevant testimonial component-be it existence, possession,
or authentication-is a foregone conclusion. Various formulations of the government's evidentiary burden have
been used. E.g., United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 260 (lst Cir.) (existence is foregone conclusion where "no
doubt" that item exists), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.)
(existence is foregone conclusion where "no serious doubt" that items exist), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985);
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1983) (government's pre-production knowledge must be
"enough to eliminate any possibility" of incrimination); Schlansky, 709 F.2d at 1083 (existence is foregone con-
clusion where "no serious question" that items exist); In re Grand Jury Empanelled on March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d
327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982) (possession not a foregone conclusion where government has not shown possession "as a
certainty"), affd in relevant part sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); United States v. Katin,
109 F.R.D. 406, 409 (D. Mass. 1986) (existence not a foregone conclusion where government not "certain" of
existence of documents); State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1979) (possession not a foregone
conclusion where state's evidence insufficient "to prove [control] beyond a reasonable doubt"). There is, however,
no consensus on this issue.
In some cases, the nature of the "foregone conclusion" inquiry has focused upon the inherent quality of the
subpoenaed item. E.g., United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 600-01 (5th Cir.) (foregone conclusion that
bus ticket exists and is in possession of bus passenger), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Katin, 109 F.R.D. at
409 (foregone conclusion that legal documents regarding immigration and naturalization exist and are in posses-
sion of naturalized citizen). In other cases, such evidence has been found insufficient. E.g., Fox, 721 F.2d at 37-38
(general rule that medical practitioners keep records of fees insufficient: government must establish that it knows
of existence and possession of such records by individual in question).
In most cases, the inquiry has been more ad hoc, focusing upon the government's knowledge in a particular
circumstance rather than upon the inherent qualities of the subpoenaed items. See, e.g., Clark, 847 F.2d at 1472-
73; First Jersey See., 843 F.2d at 76-77 (existence and possession of certain documents by branch manager a
foregone conclusion where parallel documents held by other branch managers); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, August 1986, 658 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Md. 1987) (admission of possession in 1980 and 1984
does not render possession in 1986 a foregone conclusion); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
November 13, 1984. 616 F. Supp. at 1161 (existence and possession of business records a foregone conclusion
where government is aware that subpoenaed party has second bank account and second set of records). One
relatively consistent result has been that a voluntary admission of the relevant testimonial component to a govern-
ment agent or to a third party by the subpoenaed party or his attorney renders that testimonial component a
foregone conclusion. See, e.g., Rue, 819 F.2d at 1492-93; United States v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1223
(N.D. Ill.), affd, 815 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Friedman, 638 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Jancsek, 302 Or. at 284-85, 730 P.2d at 23. See also Rosenblatt, The
Production of Business Records After Braswell: Where We've Been, Where We Are. Where We May Be Going, 67
TAXES 231, 237 (April 1989) (cautioning counsel that their conversations with prosecutors and law enforcement
agents regarding the identity, existence, and whereabouts of subpoenaed records may result in the loss of their
clients' act-of-production privilege).
97. While the majority opinion did not address the immunity issue, Justice Marshall, promoting the idea that
act-of-production immunity would generally continue to provide protection of the contents of documents, did just
that in a separate concurrence. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 433-34 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's theory is
summarized infra at notes 169-76, and accompanying text.
98. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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nas were served upon the owner of sole proprietorships, commanding the pro-
duction of telephone, bank, and business records.99 Despite the factual distinc-
tions between the Fisher and Doe scenarios,100 the Court remained faithful to
its Fisher analysis.
First, because the subpoenaed records were prepared voluntarily, no com-
pulsion was present.' 0 ' Consequently, even though the contents of the records
were both testimonial and incriminating, 02 the absence of the component of
compulsion deprived the contents of the records of any fifth amendment
protection. °0 3
Second, the inquiry then turned to the act of production itself. The sub-
poena plainly provided the requisite governmental compulsion. 04 Furthermore,
the District Court had specifically found that the act of producing the records
would constitute testimonial self-incrimination in that production would have
implicitly admitted that the records existed, that they were in the target's pos-
session, and that they were authentic. 0 5 The Court of Appeals endorsed the
District Court's findings.'0 The Supreme Court, relying upon the principles of
deference to factual findings made by the trial court and a reluctance to disturb
determinations made at both the district and circuit court levels, concurred with
the lower courts that the act of production was sufficiently testimonial and in-
criminating to come within the ambit of the fifth amendment. 0 7
Third, despite the compelled testimonial and incriminatory aspects of the
act of production, the Government could have rendered the implicit testimonial
component constitutionally insufficient by establishing that existence, possession,
and authentication were "foregone conclusion [s]."108 In Doe, however, no such
showing was made by the Government. 09
Doe thus presented a scenario in which the Fisher analysis produced a dif-
ferent result than that reached in Fisher itself. The subpoenaed party in Doe,
99. Id. at 606-07. Doe thus presented an issue previewed, but not actually presented, in Fisher. In Fisher,
the summons directed production by an attorney of records of an accountant relating to the business of the indi-
vidual claiming a privilege. In Doe, the subpoena sought production directly from the target individual of his own
records in his possession. Id. at 610.
100. Id.
101. Doe, 465 U.S. at 610.
102. Id. at 608.
103. Id. at 612 n.10.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 613 & n.ll. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981).
106. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 & n.12. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335-36 (3d
Cir. 1982).
107. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614. The deference afforded the lower courts' findings absolved the Court of the task
of supplying criteria for determining when the act of production is sufficiently testimonial and incriminating.
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion does suggest that the showing that must be made by the party claiming the
privilege is fairly minimal.
Respondent did not concede in the District Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed
or were in his possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would tacitly admit their
existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed out that if the Government obtained the documents
from another source, it would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial. By
producing the documents, respondent would relieve the Government of the need for authentication.
Id. at 614 n.13 (citation omitted).
108. Id., quoting from Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
109. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
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like the taxpayer in Fisher, enjoyed no fifth amendment privilege as to the con-
tents of the subpoenaed documents. However, because the act of production in
Doe was a testimonial communication, implicitly acknowledging existence, pos-
session, and authentication, the compelled act of production was barred by the
fifth amendment. In this sense, the subpoenaed party in Doe may fairly be de-
scribed as having invoked an "act-of-production" privilege.
Of course, even privileged testimony may be compelled when accompanied
by a grant of use immunity.110 In Doe, the Government chose not to utilize
statutory use immunity. Instead, the Government urged the courts "to adopt a
doctrine of constructive use immunity,"""' whereby the Government, without
proceeding in accordance with Sections 6002 and 6003,112 would nevertheless be
estopped from making evidentiary use of the privileged components of the act of
production against the party claiming the privilege." 3 This the Court refused to
do, instead referring the Government to the relevant statutes as the exclusive
mechanism for compelling testimony pursuant to a grant of immunity."14
The Court's conclusions left open the possibility that, following remand to
the trial court, the Government would choose to extend to the target statutory
use immunity. What would such a grant actually immunize? The Doe Court
took the opportunity to provide some cursory guidance on this critical issue.
Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the contents of the
documents as well as the act of production. We find this contention unfounded. To
satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as
broad as the privilege against self-incrimination. As discussed above, the privilege in
this case extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity
need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might accompany the
act of producing his business records.' 1 5
Insofar as the Doe Court has indicated that the government need only im-
munize the privileged act of production, and not the unprivileged contents of the
documents, the Court is plainly right. The question, however, is not whether the
unprivileged contents are directly immunized. The real issue is whether, and
under what circumstances, the contents constitute a derivative use of the privi-
leged act of production. To the extent that the contents are such a derivative
use, then a grant of use/derivative use immunity to compel the otherwise privi-
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
II. Doe, 465 U.S. at 615-16.
112. Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, discussed supra at notes 24-69 and accompanying text.
113. Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.
114. Id. at 616-17. In its opinion, the Court noted that
[dlespite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explana-
tion for the failure to request official use immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the
documents would not be used against respondent.
Id. at 616 n.I5. Despite the apparently inexplicable failure of the Government to pursue statutory immunity, there
is in fact a plausible explanation for that decision. Nothing in either of the Court's opinions in Fisher and Doe
resolves the question of the effect of a grant of act-of-production immunity. Rosenblatt, supra note 96. at 235-36.
Thus, the Government may well have been reluctant to extend to the target statutory use immunity for fear that
such immunity would preclude not only direct evidentiary use of the target's act of production, but also preclude
derivative use of the contents of the documents themselves. Id.; see also Note, Organizational Papers and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARv. L. Rav. 640, 651 (1986). This, of course, is precisely the issue
addressed in this Article.
115. Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17 (citations omitted).
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leged act of production will preclude use of the contents against the immunized
witness. The task, then, is to apply the concept of "derivative use" to the lim-
ited, act-of-production privilege. The result will be a new form of immunity
sometimes referred to as "act-of-production immunity." 116
III. EXISTING THEORIES OF ACT-OF-PRODUCTION IMMUNITY
The scope of act-of-production immunity is not easily defined. In fact, sev-
eral sharply conflicting alternatives have thus far been advanced. Four such the-
ories merit examination here.
A. The Government Approach
The government which confers immunity has an obvious interest in compel-
ling production of evidence with as little cost to itself as possible. In the circum-
stance where the holder of an act-of-production privilege must be accorded act-
of-production immunity, the government quite understandably would wish to
limit the immunization solely to the act of production itself, without any restric-
tion on the government's use of the contents of the subpoenaed items. This ap-
pears to be the view taken by the United States Department of Justice.
If immunity is sought for the limited purpose of obtaining records pursuant to United
States v. Doe, [], that fact should be clearly stated in the application for immunity.
Examination of a witness who is compelled to produce records in such cases should be
sufficient to determine whether there has been compliance with the subpoena, but care
should be taken to limit inquiries to matters relevant to the act of producing the
records since all such testimony, and leads therefrom, will not be usable against the
witness. The contents of the records may, of course, be used for any purpose because
they are not privileged."'7
Conceptually, this view requires a complete separation of the privileged act
of production from the unprivileged contents of the subpoenaed item. Use/de-
rivative use immunity obviously precludes direct or indirect use of the act of
production." 8 But because immunity is only constitutionally required to leave
the witness "in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the
Fifth Amendment,""' 9 then act-of-production immunity is constitutionally suffi-
cient if we theoretically eliminate the witness's act of production from the infor-
mation possessed by the government. 2 0 And, the argument goes, because the
116. See, e.g., Alito, supra note 65, at 29 n.4.
117. MANUAL, supra note 60, at 9-23.215 (emphasis added). This position has actually been advanced by the
United States on at least one specific occasion. See Brief for Appellant at 9-18, In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179
(D.C. Cir.) (No. 85-5755), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986) [hereinafter Brief]. The author was the Assistant
United States Attorney who represented the Government on the above appeal. As is apparent from this Article,
the author's views on the proper scope of act-of-production immunity have changed since the filing of the brief in
that case. The position of the Justice Department, however, remains.
118. This would include a prohibition against linking the subpoenaed items to the witness solely on the basis
of the act of production, Alito, supra note 65, at 63-64, or even focusing the investigation upon the witness as a
result of that link, Heidt, supra note 67, at 482 n.172.
119. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
120. See Ritchie, supra note 94, at 395.
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contents of the subpoenaed items are conceptually independent of the act of
production, the remaining contents are fully usable by the government. 121
By analogy, it has been suggested that one imagine the subpoenaed items
magically appearing before the grand jury.1 22 Under such circumstances, there
would be no act of production, and therefore no implicit testimony as to the
existence, possession, or authentication of the subpoenaed items. The govern-
ment would have only the unprivileged items themselves, and the contents of
such items would not be derived from, nor tainted by, any privileged act of
production.
Although only hypothetical, the argument is that this situation can essen-
tially be recreated by a grant of act-of-production immunity. The government
immunizes only the act of production, which essentially means pretending that
it never happened. Immunity, then, is essentially statutory amnesia. The govern-
ment must build its case without reference to the source of the subpoenaed
items, making neither direct nor indirect use of the act of production itself. But
because the contents of the subpoenaed items are entirely distinct from the act
of production, such contents do not constitute a derivative use of the immunized
act of production."23
Indeed, because of the complete metaphysical separation of the contents
from the act of production, this approach permits the government to use the
contents to prove the very testimonial fact which rendered the act of production
privileged. Facts revealed in immunized testimony may nevertheless be proved
by evidence derived from sources wholly independent of the immunized testi-
mony. 2 4 Because the government approach treats the contents of the subpoe-
naed items as wholly independent sources, they may be used to prove the privi-
leged information revealed by the act of production. 25
Suppose, for example, that the act of producing certain documents is privi-
leged because production constitutes implicit testimony as to the existence of
the documents. Under the Government approach, a grant of use/derivative use
immunity would prevent any direct or indirect use of the act of production, but
would leave the government with the documents themselves, albeit completely
divorced from the circumstances of their acquisition. The government may then
prove the existence of the documents from the documents themselves."26
In fact, because existence is manifest once the subpoenaed items are actu-
ally in the government's possession, where the only testimonial component of
the act of production is existence, use/derivative use immunity would cost the
government absolutely nothing. The corollary is that where the only testimonial
component is existence, the fifth amendment privilege is completely worthless to
121. See Alito. supra note 65, at 57-58.
122. Id. at 60; Brief, supra note 117, at 17.
123. See Aito. supra note 65, at 57-58. See also Note, supra note 114, at 651 ("Although a document's
contents are clearly derived from the act of production, the contents are not derived from the act-of-production
testimony .... Because Fisher protects only act-of-production evidence that is testimonial, a grant of immunity
for a person's act of production would not encompass the document's contents.").
124. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
125. Alito, supra note 65, at 59. See also Note, Fifth Amendment and Production, supra note 96, at 129.
126. Alito, supra note 65. at 59.
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the witness. The witness's privileged, implicit testimony that the subpoenaed
items exist may be immunized, and the witness may then be compelled to pro-
duce items the existence of which is then both apparent and readily provable.
The same analysis would apply when the testimony implicit in the act of
production includes possession or authentication, although the results would
vary from case to case. Where the testimonial component is possession, the gov-
ernment would be precluded from proving possession by relying directly or indi-
rectly upon the immunized act of production. However, the contents of the sub-
poenaed item would constitute an independent source which might well provide
proof of possession. This could be accomplished directly where, for example, a
subpoenaed document on its face reveals the identity of the producing witness.
It could also be accomplished indirectly where, for example, the subpoenaed
item has some identifying characteristic which, or reveals an alternative witness
who, can establish the identity of the producing witness.
Where the testimonial component is authentication, the same possibilities
exist. The subpoenaed item may be self-authenticating or may provide some
evidence which leads to a form of authentication alternative to the immunized
act of production. Examples of such would include serial numbers on registered
items, fingerprint or other identifying forensic evidence obtained from the sub-
poenaed item, and alternative authenticating witnesses identified from the con-
tents of the subpoenaed item.
In any of these situations, it is readily apparent that the protection afforded
by the grant of act-of-production immunity is potentially illusory. Notwith-
standing the fact that the witness holds a valid privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, by a grant of act-of-production immunity the witness may be compelled to
produce evidence which, in certain circumstances, may be used against that
very witness to prove the very matter that was privileged. 127 If use/derivative
use immunity is only constitutionally acceptable because it places the witness in
as good a position as if the witness continued to assert a claim of privilege, 28
then the Government approach to act-of-production immunity should not sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. 29
More particularly, the premise of the Government approach-that the con-
tents of the subpoenaed item constitute a source of evidence independent of the
immunized act of production-is inconsistent with the original conception of
derivative use. The drafters of Section 6002 envisioned that the prohibition
against derivative use of immunized testimony would parallel the exclusion of
evidence indirectly obtained as a result of a constitutional violation, pursuant to
127. In the ordinary use/derivative use immunity situation, it is neither contemplated nor practicable that
the immunized witness will be prosecuted. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. In fact, the Justice
Department prohibits prosecution of immunized witnesses without written authorization of the Attorney General.
MANUAL, supra note 60, at 9-23.400. However, where the grant of immunity is limited to the act of production,
no such authorization is required. Id. The Government approach to act-of-production immunity thus envisions act-
of-production immunity as an unprecedented tool for immunizing, and thereby acquiring evidence from, the target
of the investigation.
128. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
129. See Note, Fifth Amendment and Production, supra note 96, at 130.
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the "fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine."' 30 Yet the result envisioned under
the Government approach to act-of-production immunity does not in fact paral-
lel the outcome in a comparable suppression situation.
Suppose, for example, that police officers unconstitutionally coerce a con-
fession to murder from an individual, who simultaneously is coerced to produce
a firearm, indicating at the time of production that the firearm is in fact the
murder weapon. As the confession was illegally acquired, the verbal and nonver-
bal testimonial conduct of the individual would obviously be suppressed. It
should be equally clear that, absent an independent source for the firearm, the
firearm itself would be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the coerced
admissions. 131
For the purpose of determining the scope of the prohibition against deriva-
tive use, the grant of immunity should parallel the illegally coerced production
of the firearm. In the latter situation, the firearm itself is the tainted fruit of the
fifth amendment violation. Yet under the Government approach, which treats
the contents of the subpoenaed items as independent of the immunized act of
production, the firearm would not be a derivative use. This anomaly was neither
intended by Section 6002132 nor permitted by the fifth amendment. 33
Despite the critical deficiencies of the Government approach, there appears
to be support for it in some judicial opinions. 3 4 Several of the lower courts
which have indicated some support for the Government approach have appar-
ently read United States v. Doe 135 as dictating such a result.' 36 That reliance is
unjustified.
130. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1982) (excluding lead pipe obtained as
result of illegally obtained admissions); United States ex rel. Hudson v. Cannon, 529 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir.
1976) (witness testimony must be suppressed where identity of witnesses was derived from illegally acquired
confession); United States v. Guarino, 629 F. Supp. 320, 326 (D. Conn. 1986) (where police officers illegally
obtained certain admissions from defendant, including defendant's pointing to location of concealed cocaine, co-
caine excluded as tainted fruit); United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp. 843, 862 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ("all indirect
evidence, testimonial and tangible, acquired from Massey's admissions must be excluded as the tainted fruit of the
disregard of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights").
132. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. There is additional irony here. Prior to the creation of
use/derivative use immunity, the government would have been in a superior position following an illegally ob-
tained confession than it would have been in following a grant of transactional immunity. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text. Use/derivative use immunity was intended to remedy that incongruity and create consistent
results, without regard to whether the governmental compulsion comes in the form of illegal coercion or a grant of
immunity. The Government approach to act-of-production immunity would create a new imbalance, placing the
government in a superior position following a grant of act-of-production immunity than it would have been in
following an unauthorized compulsion.
133. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1429 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831
(1988); Butcher v. Bailey. 753 F.2d 465, 470 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United States
v. Porter, 711 F.2d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
626 F.2d 1051. 1058 (Ist Cir. 1980); In re Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (N.D. I1. 1989); United States
v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Ill.), affid, 815 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
McPhaul, 617 F. Supp. 58, 60 (W.D.N.C. 1985), appeal dismissed, 786 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Janu-
ary, 1986 Grand Jury, No. 217, 155 Ill. App. 3d 445, 451, 508 N.E.2d 277, 281, appeal dismissed, 116 Ill. 2d
555, 515 N.E.2d 109 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
135. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). In particular, reliance is placed upon the Court's footnote indicating that a grant
of immunity need only cover the privileged act of production and not the unprivileged contents. Id. at 617 n.17.
See supra note 116, and accompanying text.
136. For cases relvins, upon Doe, see Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429 n.3; McPhaul, 617 F. Supp. at 60; In re
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Doe reaffirmed that the contents of voluntarily-created documents are not
privileged. 137 Consequently, the contents need not be immunized. 138 It does not
follow, however, that the unprivileged and non-immunized contents cannot be a
derivative use of the immunized act of production.13 9
[T]he fact that the contents . . . are unprivileged does not mean that they will neces-
sarily remain untainted. If the government prosecutes the appellee in the future, it will
have to meet the "heavy burden," Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461, 92 S.Ct. at 1665, of
proving that all evidence it seeks to introduce is untainted by the immunized act of
production.
[I]f in fact appellee's privilege in the act of production cannot be protected
without excluding the contents . . . the District Court has the authority to prevent the
government from referring to or introducing those contents.1 40
In fact, the Court's more recent decision in Braswell v. United States41
implicitly suggests that derivative use in the context of act-of-production immu-
nity may well extend beyond the limited perimeters of the Government ap-
proach. Braswell presented the question of "whether the custodian of corporate
records may resist a subpoena for such records on the ground that the act of
production would incriminate him in violation of the Fifth Amendment.' 4 2
Ironically, while the Government successfully argued that the custodian may
not refuse production on this ground, the court's opinion did not bode well for
the Government approach to act-of-production immunity.
Long before the advent of the act-of-production privilege, the Court had
determined that collective entities enjoy no fifth amendment privilege.14 Thus,
pursuant to the collective entity doctrine, a corporation or other collective entity
could not refuse compliance with a subpoena duces tecum based upon the privi-
Two other courts grounded their decisions, in whole or in part, upon the conclusion, purportedly derived from
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), that the contents of documents are not "testimony." Porter, 711
F.2d at 1403 n.4; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d at 1058. While it is true that Section 6002 was
intended to bar derivative use of testimonial information, H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4017-18, the conclusion that the contents of documents are not testimonial is not only
unsupported by Fisher, but it is also plainly wrong.
Fisher held that a taxpayer's accountant's workpapers did not constitute testimony of the taxpayer because
the workpapers did not contain the statements of the taxpayer himself. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. That rationale
cannot justify the conclusions in Porter and in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, wherein the subpoenaed documents
included papers prepared by the subpoenaed parties.
Fisher also held that the contents of voluntarily-created documents are not privileged because they are not
the product of governmental compulsion. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10. Thus, even if the documents are prepared by
the subpoenaed party, unless the government compels their creation, no privilege exists. While this may prevent
the contents from being privileged, it does not preclude the contents from qualifying as testimonial, derivative
evidence of an immunized act of production. Indeed, it should be manifest that written, recorded, or transcribed
verbalizations are no less testimonial than the same words communicated orally.
137. Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-12. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
138. Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
139. See Mosteller, supra note 93, at 46 n.139.
140. In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179, 182 (D.C. Cir.) (opinion of the court by Sealia, J.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 924 (1986).
141. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
142. Id. at 100.
143. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnerships); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)
(labor unions); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S 43 (1906) (corporations).
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lege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, an individual records custodian
could not assert a personal fifth amendment privilege to block production of
corporate records, without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the
corporation14 or to the individual custodian. 145 In either case, the custodian was
regarded as holding the subpoenaed documents merely as an agent of the collec-
tive entity, which left the custodian with no personal privilege. 146
Braswell was the president and sole shareholder of two corporations.147 He
was served with a subpoena to produce the books and records of those corpora-
tions. 148 Relying upon intervening recognition of the act-of-production privilege,
Braswell challenged the continuing vitality of the collective entity doctrine as
applied to records custodians. Conceding that no corporate privilege existed,
and notwithstanding the fact that no privilege existed as to the contents of the
subpoenaed documents, 49 Braswell nevertheless argued that his individual,
compelled act of production constituted implicit testimony which was incrimina-
tory, and hence privileged. 150
The Court rejected Braswell's position, reaffirming the preeminence of the
collective entity doctrine even in the wake of the Court's act-of-production deci-
sions in Fisher and Doe. The Court rested its conclusion in part upon the detri-
mental impact a contrary decision would have upon the government's ability to
prosecute white-collar crime.' 5' Of course, even if the Court had recognized an
act-of-production privilege held by the records custodian, the government could
still acquire the entity records by conferring act-of-production immunity upon
the custodian. Although the Court recognized this, it expressed concern that the
proscription against derivative use of immunized testimony might seriously in-
terfere with the government's capacity successfully to prosecute the
custodian. 52
Notwithstanding the fact that the records custodian enjoys no privilege to
refuse production of entity records, the Court did extend certain benefits to such
custodians. Because such individuals produce subpoenaed evidence solely in
their representative capacities on behalf of their employing entities, the Court
directed that the act of production be deemed that of the entity and not of the
individual custodian.' 53 Consequently, in a prosecution of the individual custo-
dian, the government "may not introduce into evidence before the jury the fact
144. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
145. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101; Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911).
146. Dreier, 221 U.S. at 400; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85.
147. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 101 (1988).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 102.
150. Id. at 102-03, 109.
151. Id. at 115.
152. Id. at 117.
153. A similar limitation was suggested in Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, I 10 S.Ct. 900, 908
(1990), where the Court left open the possibility of limitations upon the government's ability to make evidentiary
use of a mother's unprivileged act of producing a child pursuant to a court order.
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that the subpoena was served upon and the corporation's documents were deliv-
ered by one particular individual, the custodian.' 54
Although Braswell does not explicitly address the scope of act-of-produc-
tion immunity, there is much implicit significance to the decision on this issue.
The Court refused to recognize an act-of-production privilege on the part of
entity records custodians, in part because it did not wish to provoke grants of
act-of-production immunity and thereby prevent the Government from making
derivative use of the individual's act of production. However, the Court did not
hesitate to prevent the Government from making direct evidentiary use of the
individual's act of production. It would appear, then, that the Court envisioned
the proscription against derivative use following a grant of act-of-production
immunity to encompass much more than a bar against direct evidentiary use of
the act of production. 155 If in fact the Court envisioned the scope of act-of-
production immunity to be as narrow as the Government approach suggests,
then a grant of act-of-production immunity would, in most cases,' 56 be no more
consequential than the constructive immunity bestowed by the Braswell Court
upon records custodians. 157 Arguably, the Braswell Court's substitution of its
constructive limitation upon use of the custodian's act of production signals a
recognition, or at least a concern, that the contents of subpoenaed items may
well constitute a derivative use of immunized acts of production in more cir-
cumstances than the Government approach would allow.
While one can draw competing inferences from Doe, Braswell, and else-
where concerning the Court's (or individual Justices') views on the proper scope
of act-of-production immunity, the fact remains that the Court has not yet spe-
cifically addressed the issue. Lower courts which have endorsed the Government
approach based upon the cursory footnote in Doe'5 have taken far too facile an
approach to the problem. The Government approach, measured against both the
154. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118. The government would be permitted to use the entity's act of production
(i.e., that the evidence in question was produced by the entity) against the individual. Id.
155. See Rosenblatt, supra note 96, at 236; Comment, Braswell v. United States: The Collective Entity
Doctrine and the Compelled Testimony Standard, 16 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 553, 574, 578 (1989).
156. The only cases where a grant of act-of-production immunity would be problematic for the government
under the Government approach would be where the testimonial component of the act of production is both
necessary to the government's case and not evident from the contents of the subpoenaed items. See supra notes
123-25 and accompanying text.
157. This arguably appears to be the view of the four dissenters in Braswell. In his dissenting opinion, which
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, Justice Kennedy took issue with the majority's position that
requiring the government to confer act-of-production immunity upon records custodians would significantly inter-
fere with the government's ability to prosecute the custodian. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 129-30 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). Specifically, the dissenting opinion suggests that, even after a grant of act-of-production immunity, the gov-
ernment "would be free to use the contents of the records against everyone." Id. at 130.
To the extent that this is an endorsement of the Government approach to the scope of act-of-production
immunity, it seems unlikely that Justices Marshall or Sealia would consciously endorse such a position. Justice
Marshall specifically rejected that view in his concurring opinion in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 430-34
(1976). See supra note 97 and accompanying text, and infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia
apparently rejected the Government approach to the scope of act-of-production immunity as a Circuit Judge
writing for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179, 182
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986). See supra note 140 and accompanying text.




legislative intent behind Section 6002159 and the constitutional prerequisites for
a grant of immunity'60 is insufficiently solicitous of the rights of. the immunized
witness. As such, it is not the answer to the question of the proper scope of act-
of-production immunity.
B. The Total Immunity Approach
The second approach to act-of-production immunity (one apparently not
seriously advanced by anyone other than some unsuccessful litigants) would be
that the contents of the subpoenaed items are always a derivative use of the act
of production. It is discussed here essentially as a bookend opposite the Govern-
ment approach. This subsection, in combination with subsection A, will illus-
trate the inadequacies of a simplistic formula for deciphering the scope of act-
of-production immunity, at either end of the spectrum of alternatives.
The argument for a total ban on the use of the contents of the subpoenaed
items might be made in either of two forms. The first argument starts from the
premise that a constitutionally acceptable grant of immunity must afford the
witness protection coextensive with the protection of the privilege itself.'6 '
When a witness is privileged from producing subpoenaed items, the incriminat-
ing contents of those items cannot be obtained or used by the government. If,
however, the government, under any circumstance, can immunize the act of
production and thereby make use of the incriminating contents of the subpoe-
naed items, the immunized witness is manifestly in a far worse position than he
was prior to receiving the immunity grant. Therefore, the argument is, the con-
tents of the subpoenaed items must always be unusable by the government in a
prosecution of the immunized witness.
The second argument (essentially a variation of the first) relies upon an
expansive notion of derivative use. But for the act of production, the govern-
ment would not have the subpoenaed items. Therefore, the contents of the sub-
poenaed items constitute a derivative use of the immunized act of production.
The flaw in the second argument is that it fails to distinguish between the
testimonial "act of production" and the "fact of production," i.e., the nontesti-
monial fact that subpoenaed items are produced. But for the "fact of produc-
tion," the government would not obtain the subpoenaed items. But the "fact of
production," lacking any implicit testimonial significance, is not privileged.
Only when the "act of production" conveys something testimonially significant
about the existence, possession, or authentication of the subpoenaed items does
the privilege attach. And only when the contents of the subpoenaed items can
be said to be derived from the privileged component of production does the
proscription against derivative use come into play.
It is true, of course, that the immunized witness is compelled to produce
items the contents of which are incriminating. But this is not enough to trigger
the privilege. A witness may be compelled to produce nontestimonial, incrimi-
159. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
161. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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nating evidence, such as handwriting and voice exemplars. 162 And when a wit-
ness is compelled to produce certain evidence, some of which is testimonial and
some of which is not, only the former category is privileged.163 A grant of im-
munity in such a circumstance would thus apply only to the former category.
Therefore, in the context of an act-of-production privilege, to the extent that
one can isolate the testimonial "act of production" from the nontestimonial
"fact of production," evidence derived from the latter is not a derivative use of
immunized testimony.
The first argument is also flawed for essentially the same reason. Although
a grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, that truism does not mean that a witness must be placed in all respects
in as good a position as he would have been in without the immunity grant.164
For example, while a witness shielded by the privilege may remain silent, an
immunized witness must testify. That testimony may leave the witness in a dis-
advantaged position by subjecting him to civil liability or public disgrace, but
the grant of immunity is nevertheless sufficient to compel him to testify.165 If
the immunized witness testifies falsely, the grant of immunity does not prevent
him from being prosecuted for perjury. 66 In fact, the government may use
truthful, immunized testimony in a prosecution of the immunized witness for
perjury committed during other portions of the same testimony. 67 Immunity,
then, is not inadequate merely because the witness is consequently disadvan-
taged. For immunity to be insufficient, the deprivation which accompanies it
must infringe upon the privilege itself, and be not merely incidental to the fact
that the witness must now testify.16O
The same principles apply in the context of act-of-production immunity.
An immunized witness may well be in a relatively inferior position insofar as
the government obtains and is permitted to make evidentiary use of the contents
of the subpoenaed items. But that deprivation is only significant if the contents
are a derivative use of the privileged aspect of the act of production. Whether
the contents constitute such a derivative use is, of course, precisely the question
raised at the outset of the inquiry. Focusing on the obvious fact that the act-of-
production immunized witness is disadvantaged advances the inquiry not at all.
It simply leads circuitously back to the question of derivative use in the act-of-
production immunity context.
Clearly, then, any attempt to sweep indiscriminately the contents of all
subpoenaed items acquired incidental to act-of-production immunity into the
perimeters of the forbidden derivative use is overbroad. If the total immunity
approach is thus overinclusive, and if the Government approach is underinclu-
sive, perhaps somewhere between these two views exists a theory which parses
162. See supra note 79.
163. Lushing, supra note 3, at 1709-10.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 n.6, 124, 126-27 (1980).
165. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895).
166. Hoffman, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Immunity Statutes: Permissible Uses of Immu-
nized Testimony, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 432 (1980).
167. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 126-27.
168. Cf. id. at 130-31.
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what is derived from the testimonial "act of production" from what is derived
from the nontestimonial "fact of production." Two such attempts are explored
in subsection C.
C. The Justice Marshall and Professor Mosteller Approaches
As previously indicated,169 Justice Marshall, concurring in Fisher,10 ad-
vanced a theory that would treat the contents of the subpoenaed items as a
derivative use of the immunized act of production under certain circumstances.
The act of production may contain an implicit, testimonial component regarding
the existence, possession, or authentication of the subpoenaed items.' 7' Accord-
ing to Justice Marshall, when the testimonial component of the act of produc-
tion consists solely of implicit authentication, a grant of act-of-production im-
munity will not preclude the government from making evidentiary use of the
subpoenaed item, provided the government authenticates the item without refer-
ence to the witness's act of production. 7 2 However, to the extent that the testi-
monial component of the act of production includes an implicit admission of
existence or possession, the "immunity grant must extend to the testimony that
the document is presently in existence."'" 3 This would "effectively shield the
contents of the document, for the contents are a direct fruit of the immunized
testimony.'27 4
Apparently, Justice Marshall's theory is that any use of the contents of the
subpoenaed items must start from the premise that such items exist and had
been possessed by the immunized witness. Because the government learns of the
existence and possession of the items through the immunized act of production,
all use of the items would be a derivative use of the immunized act.17 5
Justice Marshall's theory focuses exclusively upon the testimonial compo-
nent of the act of production, and draws a bright line based upon that criterion.
Where the testimonial aspect of the act of production includes existence or pos-
session, a grant of act-of-production immunity bars the government from mak-
ing any use of the subpoenaed items against the immunized witness. However,
where the testimonial component consists solely of authentication, the govern-
ment may confer act-of-production immunity and then use the produced items
(but not the act of production itself) without any restriction except those inher-
ent in the rules of evidence requiring authentication. 17
169. See supra note 97.
170. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 430-34 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
171. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
172. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 433.
173. Id. at 434.
174. Id.
175. See Rosenblatt, supra note 96, at 236.
176. This dichotomy has been endorsed by several commentators. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 96, at
236; Rothman, supra note 67, at 443; Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Compelled Production of Corporate
Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 958 (1986). Several lower courts have indicated that act-
of-production immunity would not bar the government from using the independently authenticated documents,
e.g., Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 470 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); United States v.
Porter, 711 F.2d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. ILL.),
aftd, 815 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1987), while at least reserving the possibility that the contents would be a pro-
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Professor Mosteller's theory17 7 is similar to Justice Marshall's insofar as
the result depends upon which of the three potential, testimonial components is
actually present in the immunized act of production, but the actual results are
somewhat different. Each of these three scenarios must be examined separately.
First, where the testimonial component is authentication, the government
may generally use the contents of the produced items to accomplish authentica-
tion, provided it "set[s] out in advance the sources it will employ to authenti-
cate . . .,18 If, however, the government uses the act of production and the
documents produced to locate authenticating evidence, then such authenticating
evidence is an impermissible derivative use.17 9 The distinction appears to turn
on when the government identifies its means of authentication. If this is accom-
plished "before production is compelled,"'180 then the use of the contents in or-
der to accomplish authentication is not a derivative use and is permissible. 181
Second, where the testimonial component is possession, the contents do not
constitute derivative use. 18 ' This is because evidentiary use of the contents "does
not involve exploitation of the communication of possession implied in that pro-
duction."18 3 Professor Mosteller's conclusion regarding possession is thus dia-
metrically opposed to that of Justice Marshall.
Third, where the testimonial component is existence, and where the im-
plicit testimony is privileged because existence is not a foregone conclusion,'"
act-of-production immunity effectively precludes use of the contents against the
producing witness. 85 This is because any use of the subpoenaed items is predi-
cated upon the fact that the items exist, a fact directly learned through the act
of production. 8 6 Thus, argues Professor Mosteller, the contents are themselves
a derivative use of the immunized act of production. 87 As to existence, then,
the approaches of Professor Mosteller and Justice Marshall yield identical
results.
Both approaches attempt to define derivative use in the context of act-of-
production immunity by focusing upon the particular testimonial component
present in the act of production. Depending upon the particular testimonial
component, the contents of the produced items will or will not be a derivative
scribed derivative use where the testimonial component of the immunized act of production is existence or posses-
sion, Porter, 711 F.2d at 1403 n.5; McCollom, 651 F. Supp. at 1223. But see In re Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645,
648 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
177. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 40-49.
178. Id. at 41.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 42.
181. Of course, when the government can identify its means of authentication in advance of production,
many courts have treated authentication as a foregone conclusion and rejected any claim of privilege. See supra
note 96.
182. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 42.
183. Id. at 42 n.132. Of course, where possession is itself incriminating, as with contraband or where it
supplies evidence of guilty knowledge, the government may not make direct evidentiary use of the immunized act
of production to prove possession. Id. at 42.
184. Id. at 48.
185. Id. at 43-48. Accord Stuntz, supra note 83, at 1278 & n.185.




use of the act of production, without regard to the evidentiary use of those items
by the government. The difficulty with this categorical approach is initially il-
lustrated by the conflicting results obtained by Justice Marshall and Professor
Mosteller. And while each approach has some intuitive appeal, analytically the
distinctions themselves are problematic.
For example, Justice Marshall would treat the contents as a derivative use
whenever existence is a privileged, testimonial component of the immunized act
of production. 188 However, his theory would not treat the contents as a deriva-
tive use where authentication is the privileged, testimonial component of the
immunized act of production. The former conclusion is logically premised upon
the fact that no evidentiary use can be made of an item unless and until one
knows that the item exists. It is, however, equally true that no evidentiary use
can be made of an item unless and until one knows what that item is. The
distinction simply cannot be justified analytically.
Suppose, for example, that the government subpoenas a witness to produce
his diaries for specified years. 189 Production would constitute implicit testimony
as to both the existence of such diaries and the authentication of them in the
sense that they are the documents designated in the subpoena. If existence is
not a foregone conclusion, Justice Marshall's approach dictates that a grant of
act-of-production immunity would bar any use of the diaries against the wit-
ness. This is because the government cannot use the diaries until it knows they
exist, which it learned only through a grant of immunity.
Suppose instead that the government has such ample proof that there are
in fact such diaries that existence is found to be a foregone conclusion. The fact
remains, however, that production is privileged because it implicitly authenti-
cates the diaries. In this scenario, the government may, notwithstanding a grant
of act-of-production immunity, make unlimited use of the diaries, including au-
thenticating them by means of textual content, handwriting exemplars, or other
uses of the diaries themselves. Although the government may not use the wit-
ness's act of production directly to authenticate the diaries, without the implicit
authentication inherent in the act of production, the government would not
know, for example, whose handwriting exemplars to compare to the handwriting
in the diaries. It is difficult to see how the use of the contents in this scenario is
any less a derivative use of the immunized, authentication testimony implicit in
the act of production than it is in the first scenario where existence is the privi-
leged, testimonial component.
Professor Mosteller's theory is at least apparently more defensible in this
regard, for he would treat the contents as exempt from the proscription against
derivative use only where the government can specify its source of authentica-
tion in advance of production. 90 But if this additional requirement means only
that the government indicate, for example, that it will compare handwriting
188. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
189. In order to isolate the fifth amendment implications in this hypothetical, we must assume that there are
no valid fourth amendment objections to the subpoena. But cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 196, 208 (1946).
190. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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exemplars of the producing witness with the handwritten items produced pursu-
ant to the grant of immunity,' 9 ' then there is very little, if any, limitation upon
the government's ability to use the contents where authentication is the only
testimonial component of the act of production. And if this type of advance
showing is sufficient in the authentication situation to avoid the bar of derivative
use, then presumably the government could accomplish the same exemption in
the existence situation by specifying in advance how it will prove existence. This
could be easily accomplished simply by examining the produced item.
Perhaps the advance showing contemplated by Professor Mosteller in the
authentication situation is a more demanding one. The actual example used by
Professor Mosteller is one where the government, prior to production, lists alter-
native individuals who will be able to authenticate the items once produced ."2
Advocates of the Mosteller approach might argue that actually identifying the
authenticating witness (in contrast with merely identifying a method of authen-
tication, as in the above handwriting exemplar scenario) is required in order to
sever the implicit authentication in the act of production from the use of the
produced items. There is, however, no analytically significant distinction be-
tween the two scenarios.
A handwriting method of authentication requires a comparison between the
produced items and an independent exemplar. So too a witness who authenti-
cates compares the produced items with his own recollection of those items. In
the case of the handwriting method, the government knows which items to com-
pare to the exemplar by virtue of the act of production."' So too the act of
production signals to the government which documents to show to the "indepen-
dent" authenticating witness. In the case of the authenticating witness, the gov-
ernment is making the same derivative use of the act of production as in the
case with the handwriting exemplar.
More significantly, the independent, authenticating witness scenario does
not allow for Professor Mosteller's distinction between authentication and exis-
tence. Where the testimonial component is authentication, the government may
use the contents provided it identifies, in advance of production, a witness who
will be able to authenticate the subpoenaed item upon an examination of that
item. Why, then, where the testimonial component is existence, can the govern-
ment not accomplish the same result by identifying, in advance of production, a
witness (obviously any conscious person) who will be able to testify to the exis-
tence of the subpoenaed item upon an examination of that item? Viewed from
the witness's perspective, if any use of the item's contents is derived from the
implicit testimony as to existence, then why is the same conclusion not required
regarding authentication, for it is only by virtue of the act of production that
the government knows which items to show to the authenticating witness?
191. See United States v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Ill.), affid, 815 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir.
1987).
192. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 41.
193. Arguably the act of production provokes the government to obtain an exemplar from the producing
witness, but this is unlikely. Much more probably, the information which led the government to subpoena that
witness in order to obtain the items would cause the government to target that witness to produce the exemplars.
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Similar difficulties surround Professor Mosteller's general exclusion of the
contents from the category of derivative use where the testimonial component is
possession. Suppose, for example, that T is the target of a homicide investiga-
tion in which the victim was killed with a .38 caliber handgun. The government
suspects that T possesses such a weapon, but lacks the probable cause necessary
to obtain a search warrant. Instead, it serves a subpoena duces tecum upon T
demanding production of any .38 caliber firearm in T's possession. T raises an
act-of-production privilege, and the government confers act-of-production im-
munity upon T. T then produces a .38 caliber handgun. With the weapon in
hand, the government first learns from ballistics experts that the gun is in fact
the murder weapon. Furthermore, an examination of the serial number reveals
that the gun is registered to N, a neighbor of T. The government then inter-
views N, who indicates that he (N) loaned the gun to T about one week before
the crime and has not seen it since.
By virtue of the grant of act-of-production immunity, the government is
obviously barred from making direct evidentiary use of T's act of production. In
other words, the government cannot introduce into evidence the fact that T pro-
duced the gun. But if the "contents" of the gun do not constitute a derivative
use of the act of production where the privileged testimonial component is pos-
session,' 9 4 then the government should be able to use N's testimony (discovered
as a result of an examination of the serial number, or "contents," of the
weapon) as evidence that T possessed the murder weapon at about the time of
the crime. 195
Whether such a result is correct or not, it is difficult to harmonize with the
prohibition against the use of the contents where existence is the privileged tes-
timonial component. The government in the above scenario presumably is in
possession of many more guns than the one produced by T. It only knows to
pursue its homicide investigation with regard to this particular gun as a result
of T's immunized act of production. In this scenario, the government's use of
the "contents" of the gun is no less an exploitation of T's implicit acknowledg-
ment of possession than is a use of the contents of items produced an exploita-
tion of the implicit acknowledgment of such items' existence.
In short, the attempts to delineate when the contents of subpoenaed items
are a derivative use of the immunized act of production, based solely upon the
category of the implicit testimonial component of the act of production, do not
produce convincing distinctions. A solution to the problem of defining derivative
use in the context of act-of-production immunity requires a somewhat different
framework.
194. In this scenario, existence would not be a privileged testimonial component of the act of production. By
virtue of its knowledge that the victim was killed with a .38 caliber firearm, the existence of such a firearm is
manifestly a foregone conclusion. What the government does not know, but for the act of production, is that T is
in possession of such a weapon.
195. As an alternative illustration, if the contents are not a derivative use of the admission of possession
implicit in the act of production, then the government can, theoretically, subpoena persons to produce illegal drugs
in their possession, grant act-of-production immunity, examine the produced drugs for fingerprints, and use that
evidence in the prosecution of the producing witnesses for possession of the produced drugs.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The problem of defining the scope of derivative use following a grant of
act-of-production immunity is obviously a difficult one. To a certain extent, the
problem is a resurrection of the "inherent inconsistency" between two princi-
ples: first, that use/derivative use immunity must leave the immunized witness
in the same position as he was in prior to the immunized testimony, and second,
that the protection afforded by use/derivative use immunity "need not be
broader than the privilege itself."1 6 But the problem is significantly more com-
plicated in the act-of-production context by the fact that, apparently, one must
attempt to isolate what is derived solely from the testimonial component of what
is in reality a single, undifferentiated act of production.
Although various approaches have been advanced regarding this problem,
the commonality among them is the notion that determining whether and when
the contents of the subpoenaed items are derived from the immunized act of
production is susceptible to some scientific-like analysis. The unarticulated as-
sumption appears to be that, if we can just identify the testimonial component
of the act of production, the scope of derivative use will materialize through the
application of ordinary scientific principles of causation. Not surprisingly, then,
the suggested solutions create categories of derivative use based solely upon the
privileged testimonial component, and generally without regard to the eviden-
tiary use to be made of the contents by the government.
There is a substantial problem inherent in this method. The bifurcation of
the act of production into testimonial and nontestimonial components is an en-
tirely abstract exercise. It is an analytical distinction that is useful and worka-
ble when one examines the act of production itself. One can, without inordinate
difficulty, comprehend the testimonial aspects implicit in the act of production,
and such a construct is helpful to an understanding of what is privileged in the
act of production. But, because it is merely a construct, it will not necessarily be
useful when examining the consequences of the act of production. In other
words, it may be that the artificial separation of privileged and unprivileged
components of a single act, without additional criteria or refinement, cannot be
carried forward with any precision into the concept of derivative use. In fact, if
one approaches the problem of defining derivative use solely by applying scien-
tific or empirical criteria, no useful distinctions will be made. Although some
particular illustrations of this problem have already been explored, 197 under-
standing the generalized accuracy of the above conclusion requires revisiting a
few fundamental principles governing use/derivative use immunity.
While the constitutionality of use/derivative use immunity is now well-set-
tled, prior to Kastigar 98 there was considerable doubt as to whether such im-
munity would provide constitutionally sufficient protection for the immunized
witness.' 9 Such a form of immunity was ultimately determined to be accept-
196. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 431. See also supra note 29.
197. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
198. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
199. See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
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able, but only to the extent that it does not leave the witness in an inferior
position.200 And in gauging the position to which the immunized witness must
be restored, it must be kept in mind that a witness is privileged from being
compelled to provide any link in the chain of evidence establishing his criminal
liability.20 1 Such a link can include focusing the government's investigation
upon particular evidence. 202
When the government immunizes the act of production, the production of
the subpoenaed items has identified for the government which items it should
focus its investigation upon. This is true whether the privileged, testimonial
component of the act of production is existence, possession, authentication, or
some combination thereof. No matter what "independent" evidence the govern-
ment may have of existence, possession, and authentication, it is the immunized
act of production which tells the government which items to authenticate, to
prove were in the witness's possession, or to prove exist.
This extremely broad, or but/for, test of derivative use, while a logical pre-
requisite, is not necessarily legally sufficient. The determination in the law of
whether something is derived from, or caused by, some preceding event is fre-
quently not reducible to merely scientific or empirical criteria.203 Policy consid-
erations often intrude upon the selection of legally significant causes from
among a greater number of logically justifiable possibilities. 2 4 In some circum-
stances, the policy criteria cannot be articulated any more precisely than what
seems to be fair or just.20 5 Indeed, the imprecision of the concept of "fruits of
the poisonous tree," the model for the concept of "derivative use," is an apt
illustration of this point.208
The question, then, is when is the government's use of produced items un-
fairly derived from the immunized act of production, and when is the govern-
ment's use of produced items sufficiently attenuated from the act of production
so that such use is not an unfair derivation of immunized testimony. The formu-
lation of the question suggests the path to the answer. Instead of attempting to
base this distinction entirely upon a metaphysical parsing of the potential testi-
monial components of the act of production, the focus should be upon the use
the government seeks to make of the produced items.
200. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
201. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 60.
203. Cf. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 110 (2nd ed. 1985).
204. Id.
205. A prominent example is contained in the Model Penal Codes formulation of legal causation which, in
relevant part, permits the assignment of criminal responsibility to an actor for results "not within the purpose or
contemplation" of the actor if "the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or
contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability
or on the gravity of his offense." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.03(2)(b) (1985) (brackets in
original). This formulation was intended to do away with artificial questions of proximate causation, see id. § 2.03
explanatory note at 261 n.17, 265, and instead to put the matter "squarely to the jury's sense of justice," id. at
261 n.17. As stated by Professor Herbert Wechsler, Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code Advisory Commit-
tee, "[i]t seems to me that when a jury asks itself whether something is too remote, it must refer to some standard
of conscience in answering that. It isn't geography; it isn't time. I don't know what the standard is, except justice.
.", 39th Annual Meeting, 1962 Proceedings A.L.I. 73-74 (1963).
206. See supra note 47.
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The proposal here is that, whenever the government attempts to use the
subpoenaed items to prove the very fact which constituted the privileged (and
hence immunized), testimonial component of the act of production, such is a
proscribed derivative use. Conversely, whenever the government attempts to use
the subpoenaed items to prove any other fact, such use is sufficiently attenuated
from the immunized act of production so as to be permissible. Some concrete
illustrations will make this proposal clearer.
Suppose that the government has subpoenaed T to produce his diary for a
specified year, and that subpoena is accompanied by a grant of act-of-produc-
tion immunity. Where existence is the privileged (and hence immunized) com-
ponent of the act of production, the government should not be permitted to use
the diary in any way to prove existence. This would include a proscription
against showing the diary to the jury or to a witness to accomplish that purpose.
The government may only prove existence by evidence truly independent of the
produced diary, such as testimony of witnesses with independent knowledge of
the diary's existence.
Where possession is the privileged (and hence immunized) component of
the act of production, the government should similarly be estopped from making
evidentiary use of the diary to establish possession. This would include, for ex-
ample, prohibiting the use of handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, or textual
content to link the diary to the producing witness. And where authentication is
the privileged (and hence immunized) component of the act of production, the
government should be prevented from using the diary in any way to accomplish
authentication. Thus, the government should not be permitted to show the diary
to an authenticating witness.
In each of these scenarios, any other result would permit the government to
compel otherwise privileged testimony, to become thus aware of the evidentiary
significance of the produced item, and to then use the item to prove, against the
immunized witness, the very fact (be it existence, possession, or authentication
of that item) which it learned from that witness through the grant of immunity.
This is true because the immunized act of production tells the government
which items to focus upon. In such circumstances, surely the witness has been
compelled to furnish a link in the "chain of testimony which is necessary to
convict [him] of a crime. ' 20 7 Where the government can make indirect use of
compelled testimony to prove the very facts revealed in that testimony, only the
most chimerical analysis could avoid the conclusion that the witness has been
"compelled in [a] criminal case to be a witness against himself." 208
207. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 566 (1892).
208. U. S. CONST. amend. V. Much the same conclusion has been suggested by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d 1239, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900
(1980). In that case, the defendant, charged with assault by means of a dangerous weapon, had been held in
contempt for failure to produce a gun pursuant to a court order. Id. at 585-86, 404 N.E.2d at 1240-41. The court
vacated both the order to produce the weapon and the subsequent contempt judgment, sustaining the defendant's
claim of fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 595, 404 N.E.2d at 1246. The court also offered the following observa-
tions on the consequences of a grant of immunity or some constructive equivalent.
The Commonwealth has not attempted to eliminate, as far as it could, the testimonial aspects of the
defendant's producing the gun, by the expedient of undertaking that at trial it would authenticate the gun
simply by the serial number (if that number appears), and would make no tender in the court room of the
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By contrast, where the government uses the contents solely to establish
something other than the very testimonial fact which rendered the act of pro-
duction privileged, 0 9 such use is outside the ambit of derivative use and is per-
mitted. In these circumstances, although there may very well be a tenuous
causal connection between the immunized act of production and the govern-
ment's use of the produced items, that connection is too attenuated to be af-
forded legal significance. Where the government is not seeking to use the con-
tents of the subpoenaed items to prove the very fact revealed by the implicit
testimonial component of the act of production, it is not unfair to treat that use
as derived solely from the unprivileged contents. The act of production is an
event that precedes the acquisition of the contents, but the use made by the
government does not derive from the act of production in any legally significant
way. Where the government seeks to prove, for example, only the truth of a
statement contained in a document, whether that document exists, was in the
possession of the witness, or is the document specified in the subpoena is not
logically necessary to the government's evidentiary objective.210 Nor does the
act of production provide the government with any investigative leads regarding
the contents (as distinguished from the existence, possession, or authentication)
of the document.
The government, which hopes to minimize the scope of derivative use fol-
lowing act-of-production immunity, would undoubtedly object that this propo-
sal, as a practical matter, would inevitably bar the use of the contents for any
fact that it was the defendant who produced the gun. We go no further than to express doubt whether the
case would have been materially altered by an offer of such an undertaking in the court below ...
Implicit statements as to existence, location, and control would nevertheless have been compelled and the
information would have been delivered over to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth could use such
information, mediately, to secure other incriminating evidence to put before the jury, and it can be as-
sumed that the testimonial statement as to the location of the gun would be used, mediately, to lead to
ballistics tests and ballistics evidence and an opinion thereon. . . . More generally, we express doubt
whether a defendant may be compelled to deliver the corpus delicti, which may then be introduced by the
government at trial, if only it is understood that the facts as to the source of the thing are withheld from
the jury.
The conclusion we reach in this case follows from basic policies supporting the constitutional guar-
anty. As was said in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973), "[i]t is extortion of information
from the accused himself that offends our sense of justice." And again: "our sense of fair play . . . dic-
tates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good
cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load,' 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961), 317;" Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
Id. at 594-95, 404 N.E.2d at 1245-46 (some citations omitted). See also Lefstein, supra note 93, at 915.
209. This can occur in a number of possible ways. First of all, of the three potential testimonial components
of the act of production, not all will be privileged in each case. Act-of-production immunity should only immunize
the privileged testimonial components, and consequently using the produced items to establish matters that arc not
revealed by immunized testimony does not violate the proposal set forth in the text. Second, the subpoenaed items,
especially documentary items, will virtually always contain substantive matters of evidentiary significance other
than proof of the existence, possession, or authentication of the items themselves. For example, a diary may
contain a confession to the commission of a crime.
210. This is not to say that the probative value of the document may not depend upon the government
establishing the existence, possession, or authenticity of the document. But if the relevant testimonial component is
privileged, and if the government would use the document to establish the very fact which is revealed by the
privileged testimony implicit in the action of production, the proposal advanced here would bar the government's
effort as a derivative use of the immunized act of production.
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purpose. Where the government would use the contents to establish the same
fact as was a privileged component of the immunized act of production, use of
the contents is barred as a derivative use. If the government cannot otherwise
establish the same fact as was privileged, the government's ability to use the
contents for other purposes is meaningless because, the argument is, the rele-
vance of the contents cannot otherwise be established.
For example, in our hypothetical in which the government subpoenas T to
produce his diary, imagine that production is privileged because all three testi-
monial components-existence, possession, and authentication-are present.
Following a grant of act-of-production immunity, T produces his diary, and the
government discovers an entry in which T confesses to commission of the crime
under investigation. The government may theoretically use the diary to prove
that T committed the crime, but may not use the diary to prove the existence,
possession, or authenticity of the diary itself. As a practical matter, the govern-
ment's ability to use the diary even to prove the admission contained therein
may be nonexistent, first because the diary is irrelevant unless authenticated,"1
and the diary may not be used to accomplish that prerequisite, and second be-
cause introduction of the diary into evidence would violate the proscription
against using the diary to prove its existence.
Invariably proof of the existence21 2 and authenticity of an item are prereq-
uisites to the relevance and admissibility of that item. In some cases, possession
will share the same status.21 ' Where any of these facts are privileged compo-
nents of the immunized act of production, the argument is that the govern-
ment's inability to use the subpoenaed items to establish such facts effectively
precludes use of the items for any other purpose as well. Thus, the objection to
the proposal offered here is that it effectively functions as a total immunization
of the contents of items acquired pursuant to a grant of act-of-production
immunity.
There are two responses to this objection. First, it somewhat overstates the
impact of this proposal upon the government's ability to use the subpoenaed
items. Second, to the extent that this proposal provides relatively greater protec-
tion to the act-of-production immunized witness than would exist under some
other approaches to the problem 2 14 it hardly follows of necessity that such a
result is objectionable. Each of these responses requires further explication.
The fact that the government may not use the produced items to prove the
existence, possession, or authentication of such items (where such facts are priv-
ileged) does not mean that the government cannot otherwise establish such
facts. What will be seen is that, under certain circumstances, existence and pos-
211. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402, 901.
212. In the ordinary situation in which the government does not acquire an item through the grant of immu-
nity, the government "proves" the existence of an exhibit through the manifest presence of that exhibit in the
courtroom. Only in the act-of-production immunity scenario does this heretofore unnoticed step in the process of a
prosecution become significant.
213. This will occur where the relevance of an item depends upon the fact of possession by a certain individ-
ual, such as where the item is contraband or where the item is a document the contents of which the government
wishes to establish were familiar to a particular person. See supra note 95.
214. See supra notes 117-60, 169-95 and accompanying text.
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session can be established by independent evidence. However, there is no way to
establish the authenticity of an item without making use of the item itself.
Once again, the hypothetical subpoena of T's diary provides a useful illus-
trative device. In our scenario, T's act of production is privileged because it
implicitly acknowledges existence, possession, and authenticity, and the govern-
ment acquires the diary by conferring act-of-production immunity upon T. The
diary contains some incriminating admissions that the government wishes to in-
troduce into evidence in a prosecution of T. Under the proposal advanced here,
it may do so only if it can establish existence, possession,21 5 and authenticity
without use of the diary itself.
As to existence, such an independent showing can be made. For example,
suppose that T has several roommates who can testify to the existence of such a
diary.218 The government need not use the diary to secure such testimony, and
such testimony may be sufficient to establish the existence of the diary without
actually showing the diary to the witnesses or the jury.2 17 As to possession, such
an independent showing can also be made in much the same way. Witnesses in
a position to have observed T in possession of the diary at the relevant time may
testify to such facts without using the diary itself.2 18
Authentication, however, presents an insurmountable obstacle to the gov-
ernment. The government may well know, in advance of production, of wit-
nesses who can authenticate the diary. But the inherent nature of authentication
is such that it cannot be accomplished without use of the diary itself. Witnesses
215. In fact, because the relevance of the diary does not actually depend upon T's possession of it on the date
of production, the government would be able to forego proof of possession as a prerequisite to admission of the
diary. The possession component will nevertheless be examined in order to illustrate how it would function in a
case in which possession would be a prerequisite to admissibility. See supra notes 95, 213 and accompanying text.
216. The identity and significance of such witnesses must be known to the government independently of the
diary itself. Otherwise, use of such witnesses to establish the existence of the diary would be a derivative use of the
diary, which would in turn be a derivative use of T's testimony (implicit in the immunized act of production) that
the diary exists.
217. This creates a procedural problem. The government may not show the diary to the witnesses or the jury
in order to prove its existence. However, the government may wish, and may be entitled, to introduce the diary in
order to prove the incriminating admissions contained therein. Obviously, once it introduces the diary for the
latter purpose, existence is manifest. The problem is how to ensure that the government in fact proves existence of
the diary independently of the introduction of the diary itself.
One potential solution would be to instruct the jury that it should not consider the contents of the diary unless
and until it is satisfied by independent evidence that the diary exists. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). But this solution
requires entirely unrealistic confidence in the jury's abstract reasoning capabilities, especially where the jury will
not be giveh any reasons for engaging in such metaphysical discriminations. A preferable solution would be for the
court to consider the government's independent evidence of existence, and, if satisfied that the government had
met its burden in that regard, to admit the diary for the jury's unqualified consideration. Cf. FED. R. EVID.
104(a).
218. Again, the identity and significance of the witness must be known to the government independently of
the diary itself. See supra note 216.
Note that the procedural problem inherent in the existence scenario, see supra note 217, will not necessarily
be present where possession is at issue. While the mere presence of an item in the courtroom is incontrovertible
proof that the item exists, the same is not true of possession. The item will only be proof of prior possession, if at
all, where the contents of the item include some evidence of that fact. In many of these cases, that portion of the
contents may be redacted without destroying the permissible evidentiary significance of the item. Thus, in most
cases where possession of the item is a necessary component of the government's case, no preliminary ruling by the
court will be required in order to ensure that the government establishes possession of the item independently of
the item itself.
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may testify as to the particular identifying characteristics of T's diary, but au-
thentication cannot be accomplished until someone (whether it be the witness or
the jury) examines T's diary in order to determine whether it matches the wit-
nesses' description. Thus, it is impossible to make an independent showing of
authenticity.
It would appear, then, that whenever authentication is a testimonial com-
ponent of the act of production, the government will be precluded from using
the contents for any purpose. As authentication will invariably be a prerequisite
to admissibility, and as the government can never accomplish authentication
independently of the produced item, the practical effect indeed appears to be
total immunization of the contents. There will, however, be many cases in which
this limitation will be of no practical consequence. This may be true for any of
several reasons.
First, one must not lose sight of the "foregone conclusion" concept.219
Where authentication is a foregone conclusion,220 no privilege will attach, no
immunity need be extended, and no proscription against derivative use will
come into play. 21 The government's ability to demonstrate that authentication
is a foregone conclusion will thus be critical in many cases. 22 As the exact
meaning of "foregone conclusion" is still somewhat uncertain,2 23 the practical
ability of the government to compel production of evidence from targets of pros-
ecutions will, in many cases, depend upon future developments in the refinement
of that concept.
Second, the privilege against self-incrimination may only be invoked by a
witness who suffers a realistic apprehension that his testimony will expose him
to criminal sanctions.2 24 Where the witness's implicit authentication cannot re-
alistically incriminate that witness, no privilege is present and, of course, the
items may be acquired by subpoena without a grant of immunity.225
Third, because the privilege is personal to the person being compelled to
testify,2 8 a grant of act-of-production immunity to a witness will not preclude
the government from making direct and derivative use of both the act of pro-
duction and the produced items against any party other than the immunized
witness. 221 Indeed, where the subpoenaed items are those of a collective entity,
the only limitation upon the government will be that it may not make direct
219. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
220. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-13 (1976).
221. This is not limited solely to where authentication is the relevant testimonial component. Although it is
possible for the government to make an independent showing of existence or possession sufficient to avoid the
proscriptions of derivative use following a grant of act-of-production immunity, see supra notes 215-18 and ac-
companying text, in many cases the government will be able to persuade the court that existence or possession is a
foregone conclusion by making the same showing prior to production. See supra note 96.
222. Cf. Mosteller, supra note 93, at 48-49.
223. See supra note 96.
224. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Lushing, supra note 3. at 1702.
225. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412-13 (1976).
226. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906).
227. There the government, pursuant to Section 6003, applies to the district court for an order compelling
production of subpoenaed items, and that application is accompanied by a grant of act-of-production immunity,
the court performs a ministerial function and must issue the order. In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986). Only if and when the government later prosecutes that witness will the
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evidentiary use of the custodian's act of production in a prosecution of that
custodian.2 28
There will, nonetheless, be many cases in which the scope of derivative use
under this proposal will effectively preclude the government from using act-of-
production immunity to compel investigative targets to produce tangible evi-
dence. The simple justification for this result, however, is that it is constitution-
ally required. In the ordinary case where the government extends use/derivative
use immunity, the proscription against derivative use rarely allows for the sub-
sequent prosecution of the immunized witness. 229 To the extent that the same
practical consequences follow from the proposal here regarding act-of-produc-
tion immunity, that proposal merely strikes a familiar balance necessary to pre-
serve the fifth amendment rights of the immunized witness. Use/derivative use
immunity, even as recast in the form of act-of-production immunity, is not a
device for compelling investigative targets to produce, even indirectly, the very
evidence that will be used to prosecute them.230
V. CONCLUSION
The intersection of the doctrines of use/derivative use immunity and the
act-of-production privilege produces an uneasy synthesis, especially in defining
the scope of derivative use. Understanding the scope of derivative use in the
context of act-of-production immunity requires focusing not only upon the privi-
leged testimonial component implicit in the act of production, but also upon the
evidentiary use the government wishes to make of the items produced. The re-
sult is the proposal offered here; i.e., that the contents of the produced items
constitute a derivative use wherever the government would use such contents to
establish the very testimonial fact which was privileged in the act of production.
Such an approach is necessary in order to preserve the fifth amendment rights
of the immunized witness. 231
government, pursuant to Section 6002, be required to make a Kastigar showing that none of its evidence was
derived from the immunized act of production. Id. at 181-82.
228. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). Braswell is more fully discussed supra at notes 141-57
and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
231. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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